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Abstract
The existing literature on inequality between private and public sectors focuses on cross-
section differences in earnings levels. A more general way of looking at inequality between
sectors is to recognize that forward-looking agents will care about income and job mobility too.
We show that these are substantially different between the two sectors. Using data from the
BHPS, we estimate a model of income and employment dynamics over seven years. We allow for
unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity to be unemployed or employed in either job sector
and in terms of the income process. We then combine the results into lifetime values of jobs in
either sector and carry out a cross-section comparative analysis of these values. We have four
main findings. First focusing on cross-sector differences in terms of the income process only, we
detect a positive average public premium both in income flows and in the present discounted
sum of future income flows. Second, we argue that income inequality is lower but more persistent
in the public sector, as most of the observed relative cross-sectional income compression in the
public sector is due to a lower variance of the transitory component of income. Third, when
taking job mobility into account, the lifetime public premium is essentially zero for workers
that we categorize as “high-employability” individuals, suggesting that the UK labor market is
sufficiently mobile to ensure a rapid allocation of workers into their “natural” sector. Fourth,
we find some evidence of job queuing for public sector jobs among “low-employability” workers.
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1 Introduction
There is an ongoing debate as to whether public sector workers experience better or worse pay
conditions than their private counterparts.1 A recurring message in the recent literature is that,
although raw differences can be large, the bulk of these is likely to reflect differences in the com-
position of the workforce, both in terms of observed characteristics such as age and education, and
unobserved characteristics. Nevertheless, a look at labor markets in the two sectors suggests that
individuals do perceive some differences between the sectors: Katz and Krueger (1991) document
the fact that blue collars are willing to queue to obtain public sector jobs whereas highly-skilled
workers are notoriously hard to recruit and retain in the public sector.
The focus of most of the literature on public pay gaps is on cross-section differences in earnings
levels.2 Yet the public-private differences are arguably equally marked in terms of income mobility,
income volatility and job loss risk than in terms of mean income levels. Public sector employers
are widely perceived to offer more job security.3 There is also plentiful evidence of relative wage
compression in the public sector. Moreover, as we shall point out, public sector incomes are
substantially more persistent over time than private sector incomes.
The motivating point of this paper is that forward-looking agents are likely to care about income
and job mobility as well as income levels, so that a more general assessment of the existence and
magnitude of a “public premium” should be based on measures of the lifetime value of employment
in either sector, rather than on comparisons of instantaneous income flows.
Pursuing this idea, we estimate simultaneously individual income processes, job loss risks and
selection patterns into the public and private sector using a rich dynamic model that allows for
unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity of individuals to work in the public sector or to become
unemployed, and in individual patterns of income levels, income mobility and income volatility. We
then combine the results into lifetime values of jobs in either sector and carry out a cross-section
1See for example Disney and Gosling (1998, 2003) for the UK, Moulton (1990) and Borjas (2002) for the US, and
the large number of studies surveyed in Bender (1998).
2The only exception that we are aware of is Cappellari (2002).
3Based on job satisfaction questions from multi-country household survey data (from the ECHP), Clark and
Postel-Vinay (2004) show that public sector jobs are perceived as more secure and more insulated from labor market
fluctuations than private sector jobs in all of the 12 countries surveyed.
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comparative analysis of these values.
We estimate this model with data from the BHPS over the period 1996-2002. We obtain a very
good model fit in terms of job mobility, income distributions and income mobility, both in and
out-of-sample (we predict income mobility over periods of up to 10 years). Our results concur with
the existing literature in showing that there is a small public pay premium in cross-sections, but
that most of the observed “raw” difference is due to selection. There are also marked public-private
differences in patterns of job and income mobility: job loss rates are lower in the public sector,
income volatility and cross-sectional income variance are lower in the public sector, and there is
weak evidence that returns to experience are slightly smaller in the public sector.
We have four main findings. First, once selection has been accounted for, the average value of a
job for life is higher in the public sector than in the private sector (with a public premium of about
8 percent when that value is defined as the present discounted sum of future monthly log-income
flows). Second, most of the observed relative income compression in the public sector is due to
a lower variance of the transitory component of income, against which there is potential scope
for insurance. In other words, we find income inequality to be greater yet less persistent in the
private than in the public sector, to the point that “long-run” inequality as measured by the cross-
sectional variance of present discounted sums of log income flows is similar in both sectors. Third,
when combining all features of employment in either sector into lifetime values, the lifetime public
premium is essentially zero among workers that we categorize as “high-employability” individuals
based on their low unobserved propensity to become unemployed. The reason is that the UK labor
market is sufficiently mobile to ensure a rapid allocation of these workers into their “natural” sector.
Fourth, we find some evidence of job queuing for public sector jobs among “low-employability”
individuals, whom we estimate to face large potential premia from public sector employment.
Some related literature is reviewed in the next Section. We carry out a descriptive analysis of
our data in Section 3. The statistical model to be estimated is detailed in Section 4 and results
are discussed in Section 5. Finally, we compute lifetime values in Section 6 and show public-
private differences taking into account wage and job mobility and compare it with cross-section
3
wage differences. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper is directly related to two separate strands of literature on public-private pay differences,
and income mobility and lifetime inequality.
As stressed above, most studies on the public pay gap focus on cross-section differences in wages
and on the impact of selection on these differences. For example, Dustmann and van Soest (1998)
find that the endogeneity of the choice between public and private sector matters crucially in the
estimation of wage differentials. With German data, they estimate wages to be lower in the public
sector for all age and education groups, and the gap to decrease with both age and education. They
also find that the potential difference in wages is larger for employees of the private sector than those
of the public sector, suggesting that workers select themselves to some extent into the sector offering
them a comparative advantage. For the UK, although raw cross-section differences show a large
positive public premium, Disney and Gosling (2003) find that, controlling for selection, the public
sector premium becomes insignificant for men and remains positive for women. More educated men
seem to select themselves into the public sector on some negative characteristics as cross-section
estimates of the public pay gap is negative and becomes positive once selection is controlled for. In
those studies, identification of the public wage premium in the presence of nonrandom selection is
achieved with either functional form assumptions (as in Belman and Heywood (1989) for the US or
van Ophem (1993) for the Netherlands) or with some instrumental variables procedure appealing
to variables such as family background (Dustmann and van Soest, 1998) or variations in public
sector status arising from privatization (Disney and Gosling, 2003) as instruments for selection into
the public sector.
Another key feature of this literature is the evidence of pay compression in the public sector.
Using quantile regressions, Disney and Gosling (1998) for the UK, Mueller (1998) for Canada and
Poterba and Rueben (1994) for the US find that the 90-10 percentile ratio and the variance of the
wage distribution are lower in the public sector. In these three studies, the public pay premium
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is estimated to be substantially higher at the 10th percentile than at the 90th. This applies to all
gender and education groups. The public premium is found to be positive for all groups at the
10th percentile, while it is negative at the 90th percentile for all except women with low education
in the UK and in the US. We argue in this paper, though, that much of this difference in income
variance across sectors relates to transitory income disturbances, suggesting that compression of
public relative to private sector incomes mainly reflects lower income mobility rather than lower
permanent income inequality in the public sector.
This paper is also related to the vast literature on empirical models of income dynamics and
more particularly on applications of these latter to the study of lifetime income inequality. This
literature has branched out into three broad types of approaches. A majority of contributions use
variedly flexible reduced form models of either absolute or relative earnings mobility to decompose
the income process into a permanent and a transitory component, interpreting inter-individual
differences in the former as measures of lifetime inequality (e.g. Gottschalk and Moffit, 1993;
Gottschalk, 1997; Bunchinsky and Hunt, 1999; Bonhomme and Robin, 2004). Our paper fits into
this first category. A second set of papers take a more structural approach derived from job search
theory to analyze inequality in lifetime values and its changes over time (see Bowlus and Robin, 2004
for the US or Flinn, 2002 for a US-Italy comparison). Whereas all these studies measure inequality
using data on individual earnings, a third approach consists of looking at consumption inequality,
which, under the Permanent Income/Life Cycle Hypothesis conveys information on long-run income
inequality (e.g. Blundell and Preston, 1997; Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston, 2004; Jappelli and
Pistaferri, 2004). None of these, however, examine lifetime differences between job sectors.
Finally, as we mentioned in the Introduction, we are aware of only one paper addressing the
issue of public-private differences in earnings dynamics: Cappellari (2002) uses a panel of Italian
administrative data to estimate a model of individual earnings dynamics allowing for unobserved
individual heterogeneity in earnings levels and growth rates. He focuses on cross-sector differences
in the autocovariance structure of log wages. His results concur with (some of) ours: in particular
he finds lower earnings dispersion but greater persistence in the earnings hierarchy in the public
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sector. However, he considers the public and private sectors separately, thus assuming exogenous
selection of individuals into sectors and taking no explicit account of transitions between sectors or
into unemployment.
3 Descriptive data analysis
3.1 Sample construction and basic description
We use data from waves 1996 to 2002 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We restrict
our sample to males who are in the BHPS in 1996 or enter the BHPS after 1996 and who have
no subsequent gap in their response history.4 The sample is restricted to males in order to avoid
issues of labor supply, such as part-time work or labor force attachment. We define three ‘sectors’
of activity or labor force status: employment in the public sector, employment in the private sector,
and unemployment.5 Our aim is to estimate earnings in the private and public sector as well as
in unemployment. To this end we use total monthly income (reported for the month preceding
the survey date), which includes incomes from labor, benefits, transfers, pensions and investment,
deflated with the CPI. We trim the income data by treating income observations below the 2nd
and above the 98th percentile of income within each ‘education’×‘job sector’ cell as missing data.6
We then keep data for individuals aged from 20 to 60 at the beginning of the panel, and we exclude
retired individuals. We hence do not model the transition into (or the earnings change after)
retirement. This leaves us with 3,791 men, most of whom we follow over 7 years.7
A breakdown of the sample by education groups (where 3 education groups are distinguished
based on highest academic qualification: “low” is O-level or less, “medium” is A-level, and “high” is
4There are in fact 12 BHPS waves available covering the period 1991-2002. We restrict the estimation sample to
the lat 7 waves for two reasons. First, for reasons discussed at length in later sections, we want to estimate the model
over a period of time which is reasonably representative of an “average” state of the business cycle. Second, we want
to spare a few years of data for out-of-sample prediction testing (see Section 5).
5Private firms, self-employed workers and non-profit organizations are classified as private sector. Civil servants,
employees in central and local government, town halls, the NHS, High Education, nationalized industries and in the
armed forces are classified as public sector.
6That is, we only drop the corresponding income observations. Individuals concerned by this trimming thus still
contribute to the sample and convey information about the selection process into particular job sectors. We also
treat any reported monthly income below £50 (in 1996 £) as unobserved. This last bit of trimming only affects
unemployed people. £50 is about 15% of the first percentile of income among employed workers.
7There is of course some attrition (about 10% at 4 years, 23% at 7 years), which we assume exogenous to the
processes of labor market and income histories.
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above A-level) goes as follows: 25.4% high, 21.3% medium and 53.2% low. Turning to job sectors,
we find that, in our initial observation year of 1996, 77.3% of the individuals in our sample were
holding a private sector job, 16.2% a public sector job, and 6.5% were unemployed. A substantial
amount of selection is going on, as the education shares of the public (resp. private) sector are
41.5% high, 21.99% medium and 36.5% low (resp. 22.9% high, 21.7 medium and 55.4% low). The
public sector thus attracts markedly better educated workers.
< Figure 1 about here. >
To see how the sector composition of the British labor market evolves over time, Figure 1 reports
the public sector share of total employment (left panel) and the unemployment rate (right panel)
among British males aged 20-60 over the period 1991-2002 (which covers our 1996-2002 observation
window). Both are fairly stable over that period: the unemployment rate drops in the aftermath
of the 1993 recession, then stabilizes around 6% in 1996. The employment shares of both sectors
exhibit variations of a magnitude of about 2.5 percentage points, with no apparent trend over our
sample period. The employment share of the public sector in the UK has decreased substantially
over the past two decades, through privatizations which took place mainly in the 1980s, and through
contracting out the provision of public services to the private sector (see Disney and Gosling, 2003,
p.3). While this raises several measurement issues, we shall take for granted that things are largely
stabilized by the end of the 1990s.
3.2 Differences in incomes
Income levels. Table 1 contains a descriptive account of public-private differences in incomes,
in the form of simple regressions.8 The first column of Table 1 shows that the raw public pay
gap over our sample period is 13.8 log points (about 14.8%) in favor of the public sector, while
8Throughout the paper, we will be looking at monthly total income. While the part-time shares are equal across
sectors in our sample of males (3.6% vs 3.8%), there are slight systematic differences in hours worked between the
public and private sector: the median number of weekly hours worked is 37 in the public sector and 39 in the private
sector, the standard deviation is larger in the private sector by about 20 minutes. By focusing on monthly incomes,
we thus slightly understate any positive public premium in hourly wages, as we do differences in cross-sectional
wage variances. The use of monthly income raises a second issue, which is that individuals who have experienced a
job/employment transition within the month preceding the interview will report an income that relates in part to
their previous employment/sector status. It is, however, difficult to overcome this imprecision by looking at data on
the elapsed duration of the current spell as this variable is missing for a substantial fraction of respondents.
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unemployment incomes equal on average 21% private sector income. Conditioning on a quadratic
in (potential) labor market experience and on qualifications (specification 2), the public-private
sector gap becomes 4.9% and remains statistically significant. This is comparable with results
found by Disney and Gosling (1998, p.354) where this conditional gap was estimated to be 5% with
1983 GHS data and 1% with BHPS data pooled over the 1990s waves. An intermediate value of
8.3% is found for the public premium when allowing for individual fixed-effects (specification 4).9,10
Allowing for different effects of education by sector (specification 3), we find a significantly higher
public pay premium for less educated workers. Finally allowing different returns to experience by
sector, we observe non-significant such differences in an OLS regression (specification 3), which
become significant again as one considers individual fixed-effects (specification 5). Believing the
latter specification, we conclude that returns to experience are slightly smaller in the public sector,
with a public sector income premium describing a U-shape with experience (with an estimated
minimum at 25 years of experience). In other words, the public pay premium seems to mostly
benefit less experienced workers.
< Table 1 about here. >
Income dispersion. The standard deviation of log income is smaller (0.38 vs. 0.51) in the public
than in the private sector, and largest in unemployment (where is equals 0.63). The 90:10 percentile
ratio of raw incomes are 2.79 and 3.55 respectively for public and private sector. The corresponding
figures for incomes conditional on age and qualifications are 2.40 for the public sector and 3.14 for
the private sector. Again, these figures are comparable to Disney and Gosling’s results: they find
the ratios of 90:10 percentile ratios of raw incomes to be 2.70 and 2.96 for public and private
sector respectively and the corresponding conditional figures to be 2.38 and 2.61. The upcoming
analysis will finally confirm that log-income variance is constantly smaller in the public sector across
9The reported fixed-effect regressions are run using within estimators. First-difference estimates are very similar.
10Disney and Gosling (1998) also found the raw public sector pay gap was reduced when allowing for fixed effects.
They suggest, however, that the probability of moving between sectors is likely to be correlated with any difference
in unobserved characteristic causing pay difference between public and private sector, so that the pay gap suggested
by the fixed-effect regression result may still be misleading. In our statistical model presented in the next Section,
we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity of individuals to work in the public sector and estimate
simultaneously the income processes and the selection into sectors and employment. As discussed below, we also
allow for unobserved heterogeneity in income and income mobility.
8
all levels of experience (in fact, in either sector, cross-sectional income variance varies little with
experience). All this is consistent with numerous findings on wage compression in the public sector.
Income mobility. The private and public sector not only differ in terms of cross-sectional income
distributions, as we just saw, but also in terms of income mobility. Differences in income mobility
are illustrated in Table 2 by the transition matrices between income quintiles from one year to
the next and at a six-year lag for the public and private sector respectively. We observe that
income ranks are more persistent from one year to the next in the public than in the private sector.
Comparisons of income quintiles between the first and the last waves are even more contrasted:
over six years, individuals in any income quintile are more likely to remain in the same quintile
when continuously in the public sector than in the private sector.11
< Table 2 about here. >
In terms of the dynamics of income levels, since the income distribution is more compressed
in the public than in the private sector, transitions between quintiles in the private sector in fact
suggest larger wage drops or increases than similar transitions in the private sector. To further
illustrate persistence of income levels, we regressed the one-lag autocorrelation of normalized log
income on a quadratic in experience, education, and interactions of current and past sector of
employment.12 Results show that income and past income are significantly more correlated among
workers employed in the public sector for two consecutive years than for workers changing sectors
or staying in the private sector, thus suggesting less overall income stability in the private sector.
11These figures relate to individuals who are employed in the same sector in year t and in year t + 1 (resp. in
all years between t and t + 6). These measures of income mobility hence abstract from wage changes caused by
job transitions (from one sector to the other or to unemployment). Transition matrices of income mobility between
quintiles over periods of 2 to 5 years convey the same message.
12We constructed normalized log income using specification 2 in Table 1. Specifically, we first regressed log income
(say, yit for individual i at date t) on our chosen set of covariates thus obtaining a predictor of mean income byit, then
regressed the squared residuals from this latter regression on that same set of covariates thus obtaining a predictor
of income variance bσ2it. We then constructed income disturbances as (yit − byit) /
p
bσ2it.
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3.3 Differences in job mobility
The following transition matrix illustrates changes in employment sector between one wave and the
next (rows refer to the initial sector and columns to the final sector):13
Private Public Unemp.
Private 96.9 1.5 1.5
Public 8.2 90.1 0.8
Unemp. 41.0 4.1 54.9
Very few (1.5%) individuals initially employed in the private sector move to the public sector while
movements in the opposite direction are slightly more frequent (8.2%). The raw job loss rates are
1.5% for individuals initially in the private sector against 0.8% for individuals initially in the public
sector. Of those initially in the public sector, 2.8% are recorded as unemployed at least once over
the 6 following waves as opposed to 5% for individuals initially in the private sector.14
Of those initially unemployed, 41% find employment in the private sector within a year and only
4.1% in the public sector. Another 54.9% are still unemployed at the next interview date. A little
under 40% of the unemployed report being unemployed at more than two consecutive interview
dates over our sample. These “long-term unemployed” only have a 30% probability of finding a job
within a year, whereas “short-term” unemployed have a 52% chance of finding a job.15 Overall,
unemployment persistence thus seems high but is comparable to results found by Stewart (2004)
with similar data.
3.4 Summary
The above descriptive analysis thus highlights the following facts:
• The public and private sector differ not only in the mean income they offer to their employees,
but also in terms of income and job mobility.
13We should emphasize that, throughout the paper, we shall be talking about these are year-to-year, between-sector
transitions. We thus overlook multiple transitions occurring within a single year, or job changes within the same
sector.
14The former number is however to be treated with caution as it relates to only 17 individuals employed in the
public sector in 1996 and experiencing at least one unemployment spell before 2002.
15One should however bear in mind that, of those reporting being unemployed at two consecutive interview dates,
28% have in fact found a job and lost it again in the past year.
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• Raw figures show that the public pay premium is higher for less educated workers. Fixed-
effect regressions suggest that it is also higher at low levels of labor market experience and
that the returns to experience are higher in the private sector at low levels of experience and
lower toward the end of the working life.
• There is substantial pay compression in the public sector at all levels of experience. There is
also less income mobility in the public sector.
• The average job loss rate in the public sector is just a little over half the average job loss rate
of the private sector.
Income and employment dynamics as well as income levels are hence quite different between the two
sectors. All this would matter to forward-looking individuals. As was repeatedly advocated by e.g.
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1993), Gottschalk (1997) and Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) (among many
others), comparisons of cross-sections are not very informative in the presence of income mobility.
Here we contend that this point is even more relevant in the case of cross-sector comparisons when
there are cross-sector differences in income mobility. It is thus desirable to use a criterion that takes
account of all aspects of the differences between sectors in order to give a more comprehensive and
accurate picture of the comparison between employment in the public and the private sector. It is
what the rest of this paper is devoted to.
4 The model
4.1 General structure
The data is a set of N workers indexed i = 1, . . . N , each of whom we follow over Ti consecutive
years. Each year we observe individual job states and monthly earnings. The data also convey
information about individual fixed characteristics. Thus a typical observation for an individual
i = 1, . . . , N can be represented as a vector16 xi =
(
yi, ei,pubi, z
v
i , z
f
i
)
, where:
• yi = (yi1, . . . , yiTi) is the observed sequence of inidividual i’s log income flows.
16Throughout the paper we use boldface characters to denote vectors.
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• ei = (ei1, . . . , eiTi) is the observed sequence of individual i’s unemployment episodes. Specif-
ically, eit = 0 if individual i is unemployed in period t, and 1 otherwise.
• pubi =
(
pubi1, . . . ,pubiTi
)
is the observed sequence of individual i’s job sectors. Here pubit =
1 if individual i is employed in the public sector in period t, and 0 if he is employed in the
private sector. Note that pubit is only defined if eit = 1.
• zvi =
(
zvi1, . . . , z
v
iTi
)
is a sequence of time-varying individual characteristics. In our application
we only consider (polynomials in) potential labor market experience, defined as the current
date less the date at which individual i left school.
• Finally, zfi is a set of individual fixed characteristics. It includes highest academic qualification
(3 levels) and labor market cohort. By “labor market cohort” we mean the year in which the
individual first entered the labor market. Hence zvi is deterministic conditional on z
f
i .
On top of observed individual heterogeneity captured by zvi and z
f
i , we also recognize that un-
observed individual characteristics may influence wages or selection into the various labor market
states. At this point we remain general and only supplement the data vector xi by appending a
set ki of such (time-invariant) unobserved characteristics. The aim of the model is to estimate si-
multaneously transitions between unemployment and employment, transitions between public and
private sector, and income trajectories within and between employment sectors. To this end we
define individual contributions to the complete likelihood—i.e. the likelihood of (xi, ki), including
unobserved variables—as:
Li (xi, ki) = ℓi
(
yi | ei,pubi, z
v
i , z
f
i , ki
)
· ℓi
(
ei,pubi | z
v
i , z
f
i , ki
)
· ℓi
(
ki | z
f
i
)
· ℓ
(
zfi
)
. (1)
The typical individual likelihood contribution is thus decomposed into four terms. The last one,
ℓ
(
zfi
)
is simply the sample distribution of observed individual characteristics zfi .
17 This dis-
tribution is observed and is independent of any parameter. The next to last term, ℓ
(
ki | z
f
i
)
,
is the distribution of unobserved individual heterogeneity given observed characteristics zfi . Fi-
nally, the first two terms in (1) are the likelihood of individual earnings and labor market state
17Recall that zvi is deterministic conditional on z
f
i and therefore does not appear in this last term.
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paths given individual heterogeneity. We further decompose it into the likelihood of labor market
states, ℓ
(
ei,pubi | z
v
i , z
f
i , ki
)
, and the likelihood of earnings sequences given labor market states
ℓ
(
yi | ei,pubi, z
v
i , z
f
i , ki
)
. Note that, even though this dependence was kept implicit in order not
to overload the equations, the first three terms in (1) depend on (various subsets of) model parame-
ters. We shall thus obtain estimates of those parameters by maximizing the sample log-likelihood,∑N
i=1 log
(∫
Li (xi, ki) dki
)
. Before we proceed, however, we have to give a precise account of our
modeling assumptions for the various components of (1).
4.2 Heterogeneity
We begin with individual heterogeneity, i.e. the third component of Li (xi, ki) in (1). As we al-
ready mentioned, we allow for both unobserved (ki) and observed (z
f
i ) heterogeneity. We consider
two types of unobserved heterogeneity, ki = (k
m
i , k
y
i ). The first type, k
m
i , relates to heterogeneity
in terms of propensity to be unemployed or to work in the public sector (called mobility classes
hereafter). The second type, kyi , relates to heterogeneity in terms of income (called income classes
hereafter) through its impact on both income levels and income mobility. kmi conditions the pa-
rameters relating to employment and sector history, while kyi conditions the parameters relating
to income distribution and income mobility. Both types of heterogeneity are time-invariant indi-
vidual random effects, which we allow to be correlated in an arbitrary fashion. The “mobility”
dimension of heterogeneity kmi deals with the selection problem outlined in Section 3. Concerning
kyi , because the propensity to belong to a given income class is invariant over time, this latter type
of heterogeneity increases the persistence of income ranks, which is found to be underestimated
otherwise.18 We refer to income and mobility classes because we use a finite mixture approach to
model unobserved heterogeneity where an individual can belong to one of Km classes of mobility
and Ky income classes.19 The total number of classes is hence K = Km ×Ky. The probability of
18This is commonly found in the literature on income mobility. Shorroks (1976) for example shows that actual
earnings processes are more persistent than earnings predicted with first order Markov processes. More on this below.
19Finite mixture approximations provide convenient and increasingly popular tools to account for unobserved
heterogeneity. Heckman and Singer (1984) is the pioneering reference in the field of economics. See also Keane and
Wolpin (1997) or Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) for recent applications in labor economics. See Bonhomme and Robin
(2004) for an application more closely related to the present paper.
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belonging to a given class depends on observed individual heterogeneity zfi , as follows:
Pr
{
kmi , k
y
i | z
f
i
}
= Pr
{
kyi | k
m
i , z
f
i
}
· Pr
{
kmi | z
f
i
}
. (2)
The reason why we adopt this particular decomposition of the joint distribution of
(
kmi , k
y
i | z
f
i
)
will become clear as we describe our likelihood maximization algorithm (Appendix B). As for
practical matters, we model both components of (2) as multinomial logits, with respectively Ky
and Km outcomes. All formal details are gathered in Appendix A.
4.3 Mobility between labor market states
We now turn to the second component of Li (xi, ki) in (1). We model transitions between three
distinct labor market states—namely unemployment, employment in the private sector and employ-
ment in the public sector—but not within each state. That is, an individual who has changed jobs
within the private sector over the past year for example will not be analyzed as having experienced
a transition. Transition probabilities are assumed to depend only on the individual’s employment
status in the previous period and on observed and unobserved heterogeneity—i.e. job states are
assumed to follow a (conditional) first-order Markov chain. Employment histories are modeled in
two stages: the probability of unemployment, eit = 0, and the probability of working in the public
sector (pubit = 1) given employment (eit = 1) are specified separately as follows:
20
Pr
{
eit,pubit | ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
i,t−1, z
f
i , k
m
i
}
= Pr
{
eit | ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
i,t−1, z
f
i , k
m
i
}
×
[
Pr
{
pubit | ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
i,t−1, z
f
i , k
m
i
}]eit
. (3)
In practice, we model both components of (3) as logits. Again, all formal details are confined to
Appendix A. Finally, we face a standard initial conditions problem in that we have to specify
the distribution of the initial labor market state, (ei1,pubi1). We let it depend on observed and
unobserved heterogeneity as follows:
Pr
{
ei1,pubi1 | z
f
i , k
m
i
}
= Pr
{
ei1 | z
f
i , k
m
i
}
×
[
Pr
{
pubi1 | z
f
i , k
m
i
}]ei1
. (4)
20Note the assumption implicit in (3) that only the date-(t− 1) component of zvi—i.e., individual i’s potential
experience at date t− 1—enters the set of conditioning variable for job mobility between dates t− 1 and t.
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Both components are again specified as logit models (see Appendix A). Summing up, the contri-
bution to the likelihood of an individual job mobility trajectory is:
ℓi
(
ei,pubi | z
v
i , z
f
i , k
m
i
)
= Pr
{
ei1,pubi1 | z
f
i , k
m
i
}
×
Ti−1∏
t=1
Pr
{
ei,t+1,pubi,t+1 | eit,pubit, z
v
it, z
f
i , k
m
i
}
, (5)
where the components of the latter product are given by (4) and (3), respectively.
4.4 Income process
Modeling assumptions. We finally turn to the more intricate derivation of the first term in
Li (xi, ki) (equation (1)), which involves the modeling of individual income paths. We consider
log-income yit both in employment and in unemployment and assume log-income trajectories yi to
be the realization of a Markov process of continuous random variables Yt. Even though we shall
(briefly) experiment with various specifications, our preferred option as to the order of the Markov
process is second-order (more extensive discussion of this point in Section 5). We will therefore
present the earnings part of our statistical model under this particular assumption.21
Temporarily omitting any conditioning variable or individual index, the likelihood of a given
income trajectory over T periods can be written as:
ℓ (y) = ℓ (y2, y1) ·
T∏
t=3
ℓ (yt | yt−1, yt−2) = ℓ (y2, y1) ·
T∏
t=3
ℓ (yt, yt−1, yt−2)
ℓ (yt−1, yt−2)
. (6)
Because we assume incomes to follow second-order Markov processes, the likelihood function only
involves products of bi- or tri-variate densities. Now bringing back conditioning variables, we assume
marginal income distributions to be normal, conditional on observed and unobserved individual
heterogeneity. That is, both mean and variance are allowed to depend on observed and unobserved
heterogeneity as well as on current labor market status:
yit | eit,pubit, z
v
it, z
f
i , k
y
i ∼ N (µit, σ
2
it)
with µit = µ
(
eit,pubit, z
v
it, z
f
i , k
y
i
)
and σit = σ
(
eit,pubit, z
v
it, z
f
i , k
y
i
)
, (7)
21Note that the longitudinal dimension of our panel is longer than needed to identify this type of income process.
Intuitively, we require three years of data to characterize the second-order Markov process, plus one additional year
for unobserved heterogeneity, hence four years in total; our panel length is seven years.
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where µ (·) and σ (·) are given functions (see Appendix A for a fully detailed presentation of all our
specification assumptions).
We next introduce the normalized log-income as y˜it =
yit−µit
σit
. The triple (y˜it, y˜i,t−1, y˜i,t−2) and
the pair (y˜it, y˜i,t−1) are Gaussian vectors with covariance matrices τ
(3)
it and τ
(2)
it respectively, which
we expand as:
τ
(3)
it =
 1 τi,t,t−1 τi,t,t−2τi,t,t−1 1 τi,t−1,t−2
τi,t,t−2 τi,t−1,t−2 1
 and τ (2)it = ( 1 τi,t,t−1τi,t,t−1 1
)
. (8)
The various τ ’s are individual-specific and are allowed to vary with observed and unobserved
heterogeneity and with employment status at t, t− 1 and t− 2:
τi,t,t−1 = τ1
(
eit,pubit, ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
it, z
f
i , k
y
i
)
and τi,t,t−2 = τ2
(
eit,pubit, ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, ei,t−2,pubi,t−2, z
v
it, z
f
i , k
y
i
)
. (9)
Here again, τ1 (·) and τ2 (·) are functions specified in Appendix A.
With the assumptions and notation introduced in equations (7) to (9), the likelihood of the
typical individual’s income trajectory yi defined in (6) now becomes:
ℓi
(
yi | ei,pubi, z
v
i , z
f
i , k
y
i
)
=
[
T∏
t=1
1
σit
]
×

T∏
t=3
ϕ3
(
y˜it, y˜i,t−1, y˜i,t−2; τ
(3)
it
)
T−1∏
t=3
ϕ2
(
y˜it, y˜i,t−1; τ
(2)
it
)
 , (10)
where ϕn
(
·; τ (n)
)
is the n-variate normal pdf with mean 0 and covariance matrix τ (n).
Three comments. A first comment brought about by our specification of the income process is
that in effect we assume (normalized) incomes to follow a familiar AR(2) process:
y˜it = ρi,t,t−1 · y˜i,t−1 + ρi,t,t−2 · y˜i,t−2 + εit, (11)
where the innovations εit are normal with zero mean and serially uncorrelated and where the AR
coefficients are related to the autocorrelation coefficients of income disturbances as:
ρi,t,t−1 =
τi,t,t−1 − τi,t,t−2 · τi,t−1,t−2
1− τ2i,t−1,t−2
and ρi,t,t−2 =
τi,t,t−2 − τi,t,t−1 · τi,t−1,t−2
1− τ2i,t−1,t−2
. (12)
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Thus, while staying close to popular linear Markov models of income dynamics, we allow for more
flexibility than the standard linear AR(2) model by letting the various τ ’s (and thus the ρ’s) depend
on individual (observed and unobserved) attributes as in (9). This will prove useful in fitting the
observed mobility of income ranks. But most importantly, this is necessary to inform one of the
key questions of this paper, that is how income mobility varies across sectors (and individuals).
Our model offers at least two simple indices of income mobility (the τ ’s and the ρ’s) which can be
used to address this question.22
The second comment relates our paper to the recent literature on the use of copulas in models
of income dynamics and sheds additional light on the status of the the τ ’s as measures of relative
income mobility. An alternative way of approaching the likelihood of individual income sequences
consists in decomposing the joint density ℓ (yt, yt−1, yt−2) appearing in the numerator of (6) as
the product of marginal densities of log income yt, denoted ft (yt), ft−1 (yt−1) and ft−2 (yt−2) and
a copula density of income ranks Ft (yt), denoted ct,t−1,t−2 [Ft (yt) , Ft−1 (yt−1) , Ft−2 (yt−2)]. The
copula density is the joint density of successive income ranks and thus describes relative income
mobility between t − 2 and t.23 Similarly, we can write the joint density ℓ (yt, yt−1) appearing in
the denominator of (6) as ft (yt) × ft−1 (yt−1) × ct,t−1 [Ft (yt) , Ft−1 (yt−1)], where ct,t−1 (·) is now
the joint density of income ranks at dates t and t − 1. Using these decompositions, the likelihood
in (6) now becomes:
ℓ (y) =
[
T∏
t=1
ft (yt)
]
×

T∏
t=3
ct,t−1,t−2 [Ft (yt) , Ft−1 (yt−1) , Ft−2 (yt−2)]
T−1∏
t=3
ct,t−1 [Ft (yt) , Ft−1 (yt−1)]
 . (13)
The use of copulas thus allows decomposition of the likelihood of an income trajectory into the
product of cross-section densities at all time periods and the likelihood of the trajectory of relative
22We choose to parameterize the autocovariances of income disturbances (the τ ’s—see equation (9)) rather than the
AR coefficients (ρ’s) because the former are the moments that we end up matching in the estimation (see Appendix
B). In fact, the τ ’s are easier to handle as they come up “naturally” in the likelihood function (10) and also because
the fact that τ
(n)
it is a correlation matrix imposes a number of natural restrictions on its elements (for instance,
because τi,t,t−1 is a correlation coefficient, it has to lie within the interval [−1; 1]). The corresponding restrictions on
the AR coefficients are more cumbersome.
23Copulas are a standard element of the empirical finance toolkit. They were recently brought to labor economics
by Bonhomme and Robin (2004). The (unique) decomposability of any (continuous) joint density into the product
of marginal densities and a copula density is a result known as Sklar’s theorem.
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income ranks within these cross-section distributions.
In the special case of our model, given our normality assumptions, the marginal distributions
of income levels are all normal (e.g. ft (yt) =
1
σit
· ϕ (y˜it) and Ft (yt) = Φ (y˜it) where Φ (·) is the
standard normal cdf) and the copulas of income ranks are Gaussian with parameters τ
(n)
it .
24 Yet the
formulation (13) of the likelihood of income trajectories holds true independently of any functional
form assumption on either the marginal income distributions or the copulas. So we could use
this specification to estimate income trajectories under more general distributional assumptions.
Its equivalence to the AR(2) specification of income processes, however, rests on our normality
assumptions for both the marginal and copula distributions.
The third and final comment bears on our overall specification of the joint income and job
mobility process. An implicit assumption in the model is that innovations to the income process
(the εit shocks in equation (11)) are independent of the transitory shocks governing mobility across
labor market states (the underlying error terms in the various logit models of (3)). This amounts
to assuming that the individual income process only influences individual mobility between labor
market states through either observed individual attributes (education, experience. . . ) or through
the unobserved individual random effects kmi and k
y
i (the latter being time-invariant), and not
through transitory income shocks. While feasible in principle, relaxing this restriction would involve
great numerical complexity as it would destroy the separability property of the likelihood function
into a block relating to labor market mobility and another relating to income.
4.5 Likelihood maximization
Given the specifications of individual contributions to the complete likelihood, Li (xi, ki) defined
in the previous three sub-sections, we obtain parameter estimates by maximization of the sample
24The (n-variate) Gaussian copula has cdf Cn (u1, . . . , un; τ
n) = Φn
 
Φ−1 (u1) , . . . ,Φ
−1 (un) ; τ
n

. The correspond-
ing copula density is thus defined by
cn (u1, . . . , un; τ
n) =
ϕn
 
Φ−1 (u1) , . . . ,Φ
−1 (un) ; τ
n

ϕ (Φ−1 (u1)) · . . . · ϕ (Φ−1 (un))
.
It is straightforward to check that using these normal margins and Gaussian copulas in (13) delivers exactly (10).
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log-likelihood:
N∑
i=1
log
 Km∑
kmi =1
Ky∑
kyi =1
Li [xi, (k
m
i , k
y
i )]
 , (14)
where individual random effects ki = (k
m
i , k
y
i ) were integrated out of the complete likelihood (1).
The procedure that we use to carry out the maximization of (14) is fully described in Appendix
B.25
5 Results
We now present estimation results under the assumption that individuals sort themselves into 3
mobility classes and 2 income classes. Our approach to selecting the number of classes is very
pragmatic, in that we take the minimal number of classes allowing the model to fit the data
reasonably closely. This turns out to be Km = 3 and Ky = 2.26
Given our choice of six classes, the number of parameters to estimate is 87. Tables of coefficient
estimates and standard errors are reported in Appendix C. In this section, rather than commenting
on each coefficient directly, we chose to focus on more readily interpretable statistics pertaining to
the various building blocks of our model.
5.1 Labor market states
Worker allocation and mobility between states. We thus have 3 groups of mobility het-
erogeneity, each containing a non-trivial fraction of the entire population. Selection patterns into
labor market states (private employment, public employment and unemployment) differ widely
across mobility classes (Table 3). Class 2 (which comprises about 14% of the population) has a
very high unemployment rate of 39%, and otherwise tends to be over-represented in the public
25The highly nonlinear nature of (14) and the relatively large number of parameters to be estimated render any
frontal attack on this maximization problem numerically cumbersome. The main numerical issue is to find initial
parameter values to feed into the optimization routine that are “not too far” from the optimal values. We thus
proceed in two stages, by first “calibrating” the model using a sequential version of the EM algorithm (Dempster
et al., 1977), and then using the parameter estimates obtained from this first stage as initial values for the full
maximization of (14).
26Popular model selection criteria based on penalized likelihood (AIC, BIC) tend to suggest we should consider
larger numbers of classes. However, increasing the number of classes only entails marginal gains in terms of fit
(results with 3 income classes are available upon request), while considerably increasing computing time. Moreover,
an additional advantage of limiting the number of classes to a minimum is expositional convenience.
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sector (compared to the aggregate figure—bottom panel of Table 3). Members of class 1 (resp.
class 3), on the other hand, overwhelmingly select themselves into the public (resp. private) sector.
The latter two classes both have very low, roughly equal rates of unemployment. The largest group
is class 3, comprising 70% of the sample.
< Tables 3 and 4 about here. >
Table 4 shows the average year-to-year transition probabilities between labor market states,
separately for each class and for the whole sample. These transition probabilities are “clean” of
selection effects in that they are all based on the whole sample rather than on the subsamples of
individuals effectively observed in a given sector. Comparison of the whole sample panel of Table 4
with the raw transition probabilities in subsection 3.3 points to nonrandom selection of individuals
into labor market states. Most remarkably, unemployment is almost 3.5 times as persistent in the
selected population of unemployed workers as in the whole sample. Also, the public-private gap in
job loss rates, while still negative, is much smaller (divided by four as a proportion) once selection
effects are removed. All this confirms the importance of accounting for individual heterogeneity.
Consistently with the figures shown in Table 3, we see that members of mobility class 1 (resp.
3) have very high rates of persistence in- and transition into the public (resp. private) sector. Both
of these classes have low job loss rates. Note that the job loss rate is worse in the private than in
the public sector for classes 1 and 2, and are roughly equal in both sectors for the private class
(km = 3). Members of mobility class 2 are otherwise rather mobile between employment sectors
(compared to the aggregate figures reported in the bottom-right panel of Table 4). Moreover, they
are at relatively high risk of becoming unemployed and they tend to stay unemployed longer. Class
2 thus appears to gather “low-employability” workers tending to take public sector jobs.
Determinants of unobserved mobility heterogeneity. The top panel of Table 5 reports the
composition of our 3 mobility classes in terms of observed individual characteristics. Class 2 (the
“low-employability” class) is substantially less experienced and exhibits an education composition
concentrated in the high and low groups. Class 1 (the “public” class) has markedly less low-educated
workers, and a high proportion of high-educated workers. They also tend to be marginally more
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experienced than average. Finally, class 3 (the “private” class) has a relatively high proportion of
low-educated workers. As they account for 70% of the sample, they otherwise have characteristics
that are close to those of the whole sample. These results parallel the raw figures given in Section
3 about the composition of sectors by education levels.
< Table 5 about here. >
5.2 Income
Income dispersion. We have 2 income classes, with total sample weights of 58.3% for class
ky = 1 and 41.7% for class ky = 2. The top two panels of Figure 2 show mean income together
with the 10th and 90th percentiles of income as a function of experience for each income class and
sector. The bottom left panel shows similar profiles for the whole sample correcting for selection
effects (i.e. assuming that everyone is in either sector), while the bottom right panel shows these
profiles given the selection of individuals into sectors. The top two panels of Figure 2 show that
members of income class 1 tend to earn higher incomes. Their income-experience profile is also
“more concave”, meaning that the mean returns to experience are higher for members of income
class 1 at early stages of their working lifes, and taper off faster as they grow more experienced.
Finally, income dispersion varies very little with experience, as the 10th and 90th percentile lines
are approximately parallel on all panels.27
< Figure 2 about here. >
The striking fact about Figure 2, however, is that the public gap is very different between
classes: while members of income class 2 clearly benefit from public sector employment, both in
terms of mean income and income dispersion, the public premium is virtually inexistent on both
accounts for members of income class 1. In figures, the average public premium is of 15 log points
for class 2 and slightly under 1 log point for class 1. The cross-sector differences in income standard
deviations are of 20 log points for class 2 and less than 1 log point for class 1. Returns to experience
27In figures, the cross-sectional standard deviation of income conditional on experience increases significantly by
2.7 log points every additional ten years of experience in the private sector and by 1.1 log points in the public sector.
Table C2 in Appendix C also gives direct information on the experience profile of the standard deviation of income
disturbances. This increases by 4.1 log points every ten years of experience, both sectors pooled.
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look very similar in both sectors for each income class. In search of a better denomination, we shall
henceforth refer to members of income class 1 (resp. income class 2) as “low public premium” (resp.
“high public premium”), bearing in mind that class 1 also tends to earn overall higher incomes than
class 2.
Looking at whole sample figures, the average potential public premium is of 7 log points. The
cross-sector gap in income dispersion is more substantial, with a markedly lower (10 log points)
standard deviation of income in the public sector. This squares in well with the recurring finding
of income compression in the public sector. Finally, the average income public premium in the
selected sample (bottom-right panel) is higher at about 17 log points. Comparison of the bottom
two panels of Figure 2 thus confirms the prominent part played by non-random sorting of workers
across employment sectors in explaining the apparent public premium. We shall discuss selection
patterns at more length in a later Section.
< Table 6 and Figure 3 about here. >
Income mobility. Table 6 shows the average income quintile transition probabilities from one
year to the next for each separate income class and for the whole sample. The class-specific
matrices suggest that members of income class 1 (resp. class 2) also qualify as “income stayers”
(resp. “income movers”). In other words, members of income group 2 tend to have earnings that
are both slightly lower on average and less stable over time than members of income group 1. Part
of this instability naturally results from the likely higher job instability of type ky = 2 workers.
As we shall see in the next paragraph, income heterogeneity is indeed correlated with mobility
heterogeneity.
A different perspective on income mobility is shown on Figure 3, which shows the autocovariance
at one lag of income disturbances (the τ1it coefficient in the model) as a function of experience and
for each sector and class. This Figure confirms the pattern observed above in Table 6, that is,
individuals of income class 1 tend to be “income-stayers” while class 2 individuals exhibit more
mobile incomes. It appears from the top two panels that income persistence increases somewhat
with experience. As for mean incomes, being employed in the public sector has a much larger
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impact on members of class 2 than on members of class 1 in terms of income persistence. For both
groups, public sector employment is associated with more income persistence. Finally, selection
does not appear to have much impact on this measure of income persistence.
Determinants of unobserved income heterogeneity. The education and experience compo-
sition of our two income classes is shown in the middle panel of Table 5. Members of class 2 (the
“high public premium” class) are somewhat older and clearly less educated than average.
Table 5 also reports the joint distribution of our latent heterogeneity classes (in the form of
conditionals). Clearly, the two dimensions of heterogeneity are not independent, as being a “high
public premium” type (ky = 2) is likely associated with being a “low-employability” mobility type
(km = 2). “High public premium” income types are also slightly under-represented in the “private”
mobility class (km = 1). Hence the correlation between income types and mobility types is far from
perfect. All but one of our Km × Ky = 6 latent classes of unobserved heterogeneity represent a
non-negligible share of the sample: the least frequent combination is for an individual to be a “low
public premium” type and at the same time a “low-employability” mobility type (i.e. ky = 1 and
km = 2)—these only account for 4% of the total sample.
5.3 Model fit and model specification
Simulations. We end this discussion of our estimation results with a brief fit and specification
analysis of the statistical model of Section 4. We thus want to simulate our model in order to com-
pare actual and model-generated data. To this end, we replicate our sample 6 times (i.e. as many
times as there are unobserved heterogeneity classes in total) and use our estimated job mobility
and income processes to simulate individual labor market trajectories for each individual/class in
the sample. We then produce simulated descriptive statistics, weighting each {individual i, class
(km, ky)} observation by the probability that individual i belongs to mobility class km and income
class ky, given individual i’s observed characteristics xi, Pr {k
m
i = k
m, kyi = k
y | xi}.
28
28These probabilities are computed in the E-step of the EM algorithm which we use in the calibration stage of our
estimation procedure. See Appendix B.
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Worker allocation and mobility between states. We begin with an assessment of our model’s
capacity to capture the observed patterns of worker allocation into the various labor market states.
First looking at “cross-sectional” statistics, it appears that the model is able to fit the numbers
presented in Table 3, i.e. the private employment, public employment and unemployment rates,
perfectly (up to a fraction of a percentage point in each case). Turning next to labor market
transitions, the top panel of Table 7 shows the observed and simulated cross-job-state transition
matrices at intervals of one, two and six years (which is the maximum possible lag in a seven-
year panel).29 Here again the fit is excellent. The maximum discrepancy between observed and
simulated transition matrices is less than 2%.30
< Table 7 about here. >
These, however, are in-sample predictions, which only show that the model does a good job at
replicating the particular data that it was estimated to fit. Since we in fact have 12 available waves
of BHPS data (covering the period 1991-2002—see Section 3) out of which we only used the last
7 for estimation, we can use the first 5 waves for out-of-sample prediction testing. Many (about
a third) of the 3,791 men present in our 1996-2002 estimation sample are in fact present in all 12
waves of the BHPS. For these people we can construct observed labor market state (or income
quintile—see below) transition matrices at intervals of up to 11 years, and then compare these
matrices to their model-based counterparts. The bottom panel of Table 7 presents this comparison
for a lag of 10 years.31 The maximum absolute prediction error that we make here is in the order
of 10 percentage points. The main discrepancy between the observed and predicted transition
matrices is that we seem to be over-predicting the persistence of unemployment and employment in
the public sector at long lags, the flip side of this being that we under-predict transitions into the
29Unreported matrices are available on request and convey a similar message.
30One should however bear in mind that the number of observations from which the observed transition rates at
long lags are computed is rather small. For instance, only 15 people in the sample are unemployed in both years 1996
and 2002.
31Because of a change in coding of the job sector variable in the data source from wave 5 onward, the job sector
data prior to 1996 are possibly a bit less reliable. Moreover, yet another coding change in 1992 makes the first wave
job sector data difficult to compare with similar data from other waves. This is the reason why we only present
the out-of-sample prediction test at a distance of 10 (rather the maximum 11) years. We also do not report the
predictions at shorter lags (to save on space). Those are available on request. Based on numerous simulations, we
can however safely consider that the prediction error we make at 10 years’ distance is an upper bound on prediction
errors at shorter lags.
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private sector. Specifically, we are overstating somewhat the probability that someone observed to
be either unemployed or holding a public sector job in 1992 be found in the same state 10 years
later. What this seems to indicate is that both unemployment and public sector employment were
more persistent over our 1996-2002 estimation period than they were in the first half of the 1990’s.
In spite of these discrepancies, the overall performance of our statistical model at predicting
labor market state transitions is arguably satisfactory enough. We should indeed bear in mind that
the number of observations on which observed job state transition matrices at long lags are based is
very small in many cases: for instance, only 7 individuals in the sample were recorded unemployed
in both extreme years 1992 and 2002. Thus, at this level of precision, our comparison exercise
is only indicative of the fact that the model-based data still bears a close enough relationship to
actual data even at long lags.
Income dispersion and income mobility. Now turning to the income data, we first assess
the model’s capacity to replicate observed cross-sectional income distributions. Figure 4 plots the
observed and predicted log-income densities for the three labor market states separately, and for
the sample as a whole. It also shows the income class-specific densities, normalized at the relative
size of each class within each particular labor market state.
< Figure 4 about here. >
First looking at the whole-sample graph (bottom-right panel), we see that the overall fit is
very good, meaning that a mixture of two normal densities is enough to deliver a very good
approximation of the sample income density. Moreover, the class-specific densities give a visual
confirmation of the characterization of classes in terms of income means of variances given above.
Turning next to state-specific densities, we also find a satisfactory fit for all three states, with the
qualification that the model is unable to fully capture the irregularity of the unemployment income
distribution. However, this irregularity is probably mainly a consequence of the limited number
of observations from which the observed distribution is estimated (253, all years pooled).32 In
32Moreover, somewhat surprisingly, the “unemployment” graph reveals that class 1 earns less than class 2 in
unemployment (−25 log points). Yet, as we also see from this graph, members of income class 1 are unemployed
much less often than members of income class 2. Moreover, the variance of unemployment incomes is a lot smaller
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any case it appears that the model generates an acceptable smoothing of the observed density of
unemployment income.33
The model’s ability to fit patterns of income mobility on top of cross-sectional income dispersion
is of primary importance for our purposes. Following the same route as we did for job mobility, we
now simulate full individual labor market histories—featuring income and job state transitions—
and compare the thus obtained income quintile transition matrices with those directly estimated
from the sample. We do this at lags from one to ten years and report the results in Table 8.
< Table 8 about here. >
The maximum absolute discrepancy between observed and predicted quintile transition matrices
is less than 10 percentage points at all lags, including 10 years which corresponds to an out-of-
sample prediction (bottom panel of Table 8). This is a remarkable outcome. First, recall that
we only have six latent classes in total, of which only two of income heterogeneity. This minimal
specification of unobserved heterogeneity combined with a second-order Markov income process
seems to deliver a good replication of income mobility even at long lags. Second, it turns out
that the magnitude of the prediction error does not tend to increase as one looks at longer time
intervals.34 The good fit that we obtain thus constitutes strong support for our model specification.
A discussion of possible alternative specifications. Incomes are highly persistent, and our
combined assumption of second-order Markov and time-invariant unobserved income heterogeneity
goes a long way into capturing this persistence. Yet looking at the nature of prediction errors,
we detect a systematic tendency of the model to over-predict income mobility somewhat. This
aspect of the model could potentially be improved on by specifying the income process as a Markov
process of order higher than 2 or by adding to the number of income heterogeneity classes. Yet the
computational cost of our estimation procedure increases very quickly as one expands the model in
among members of income class 1 than for income class 2.
33The “observed” density plotted on Figure 4 is produced by a Gaussian kernel estimator with a bandwidth
determined using the rule of thumb h = 0.9×std (log income) /n1/5, which already does a certain amount of smoothing
to the corresponding histogram.
34The error is in the order of 5 to 10 percentage points at all time intervals considered, including time intervals
relating to out-of-sample predictions. The numbers are available upon request. Note also that, contrary to labor
market state transition matrices, all elements of the observed income mobility matrices are based on reasonably large
numbers of observations.
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either dimension, often for relatively modest gains in terms of fit. One is therefore bound to settle
for a compromise.
Now surely, there is a long list of (tractable) alternative specifications. The simplest possible
“first-pass” specification is just to do away with any unobserved heterogeneity. Unfortunately,
while such a “homogeneous” model is very quick and easy to estimate in practice, it generally
grossly over-predicts both job and income mobility at lags beyond one or two years. Besides this
first possibility, probably one of the most popular specification in the literature is that of a first-
order Markov (e.g. AR(1) in levels) income process. In the context of the present paper, first-order
Markov income processes are a bit simpler analytically and quicker to estimate given a fixed number
of heterogeneity classes. Yet they don’t fit the data quite as well: estimating our model with two
classes of income heterogeneity under the assumption that ρi,t,t−2 = 0 (see equation (11)) yields
income mobility in-sample (i.e. at distances of up to 6 years) prediction errors that are on average
50% larger than those reported in Table 8. Increasing the number of income classes to three, one is
back with in-sample prediction errors very similar to those obtained from our baseline second-order
Markov assumption. Yet the out-of-sample prediction error at a 10 year distance is on average
twice as large in the {Markov(1), Ky = 3} as in the {Markov(2), Ky = 2} case. Moreover, the
latter specification is less costly in computational terms than the former.
Overall, there appears to be a trade-off between the amount of “built-in” persistence result-
ing from the assumption made on the order of the Markov process, and the extra bit of income
autocorrelation brought about by time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Our choice of second-
order Markov with a small number of classes was mainly guided by a concern for parsimony and
by the particular configuration of the data. Our estimation sample has a relatively small cross-
section dimension, balanced by a long longitudinal dimension (far longer than it takes to identify a
second-order Markov process). A specification with less unobserved heterogeneity and more built-
in persistence is probably better suited and more computationally economical in this particular
configuration.35 Moreover, as we just mentioned, the second-order Markov assumption seems im-
35The N/T ratio of the particular data set used surely plays a crucial role in the choice of a specification. To
take another example, in their application of similar estimation techniques to the French labor force survey Enqueˆte
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portant to ensure good long-term predictions of income mobility—a valuable property for the main
purpose of this paper, which is to use the model to construct lifetime values of individual labor
market trajectories.
6 The public pay gap: incomes and lifetime values
In this Section we take a more systematic look at selection into the public sector and at public-
private differences from the twofold perspective of income flows and lifetime values. To this end,
we first construct lifetime values, then analyze differences across sectors. Finally, we examine these
differences under counterfactual assumptions on sector choice.
6.1 Construction of lifetime values
Definitions. Using our estimated coefficients for income distributions, income and job mobility,
we can carry out simulations of employment and income trajectories for the individuals in our
sample until retirement age. Assuming that, upon retiring (which we assume to happen at a level
of experience denoted as TR), a given individual enjoys a residual value of VR, then the lifetime
value as of experience level t of an individual’s simulated future income trajectory ys≥t is written
as:
Vt
(
ys≥t
)
=
TR∑
s=t
βs−t · U (ys) + β
TR−t · VR, (15)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor and U (yt) is the utility flow that the individual derives from
(log) income yt. At each level of experience t, current income yt is conditional on the individual’s
characteristics and labor market state as specified in our statistical model (see Section 4 and
Appendix A).
We can naturally consider different functional forms and/or parameterizations for (15) to allow
the individuals to exhibit various degrees of time preference or risk aversion. In the sequel we shall
mainly consider the following two baseline specifications:
U (yt) = yt (Logarithmic)
emploi, Bonhomme and Robin (2004) are constrained to use a first-order Markov specification as the T -dimension of
their sample is only three years (compensated by a very large N -dimension).
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U (yt) =
e(1−1/η)yt
1− 1/η
. (CRRA)
The logarithmic specification simply assimilates lifetime values Vt
(
ys≥t
)
to present discounted
sums of future log income flows. Given our modeling of income as log-additive in a perma-
nent/deterministic component and a transitory random shock (see equation (A5) in Appendix
A), simply taking the present discounted sum of future log income flows is representative of a situ-
ation where individuals are indifferent to or can insure themselves against those transitory random
shocks.36
Even though the “perfect insurance market” situation underlying the logarithmic specification
is an arguably useful benchmark, it nonetheless has the inconvenience of assuming away any im-
pact of cross-sector differentials in income risk. To get round this problem, we shall also consider
the more general CRRA specification shown above, where η denotes the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution.37 While admittedly, this latter specialization is theoretically a bit awkward in the
absence of a fully-fledged model of consumption and income smoothing over the life cycle, it still
constitutes a simple way of taking into consideration the impact of income uncertainty.38 In an
attempt to generate clear-cut results, we will assume a fairly large income smoothing motive by giv-
ing the elasticity of intertemporal substitution a value on the low side of conventional calibrations,
η = 0.5.
We set the discount factor to β = 0.9 per annum. Finally, we define the value of retirement as
VR =
1
1−β · U (yTR−1 + lnRR) in both the logarithmic and the CRRA case, where RR designates
the replacement ratio. That is, we assume that after retirement, individuals receive a constant flow
of income equal to RR times their last income in activity and discount this flow over an infinite
36Again given our log-additive modeling of income, considering a (perhaps more natural) specification of U (·)
as linear in income, i.e. U(ys) = e
ys , would introduce a preference for a higher variance of the random income
disturbance.
37Note that what we term the “CRRA” specification is also a CARA specification in log incomes. Hence the
logarithmic specification confounds itself with the special case η = +∞.
38In the end, the question of which specification is more adequate boils down to that of how closely consumption
tracks income. The recently growing literature on consumption inequality seems to conclude that the truth lies
somewhere in between the perfect insurance and the consumption equals income cases. See e.g. Gourinchas and
Parker (2002), Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2004) for work on US data, or Jappelli and Pistaferri (2004) on
Italian data.
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number of years.39 We calibrated the value of RR at 0.40, which is roughly the average ratio of the
first income in retirement to the last income in activity for men in the BHPS over the 1996-2002
period. Sensitivity of our main results to changes in all these numbers will be analyzed.
Two caveats. Before we proceed, we should raise the following two caveats. First, in order to
compute these lifetime values, we assume that the economic environment is stationary. That is,
agents anticipate getting older and experiencing wage and job mobility given their current wage and
job status, but they do not anticipate the model parameters to change over the rest of their working
life. For this assumption to be credible, we need our sample period to be fairly representative of
an “average” state of the business cycle. As we showed in Section 3 (Figure 1), both the share of
public sector employment and the unemployment rate over our sample period are stable enough.
The second issue is that it is not straightforward to compare measures of the lifetime public
premium involving different specifications of the instantaneous utility function (logarithmic vs.
CRRA)—or, for that matter, to compare any measure of a lifetime public premium, which involves
a utility function, with a public premium in terms of income. In order to produce a measure that
has at least some comparability across specifications of U (·), we use the following transformations:
V (·) 7→ V˜ (·) = (1− β) · V (·) (Logarithmic)
V (·) 7→ V˜ (·) =
η
η − 1
log
[
η − 1
η
· V (·)
]
, (CRRA)
and define the (relative) lifetime public premium (measured in log points) as the difference V˜public−
V˜private. The above transformations are such that scaling all future income flows up or down by n%
will result in V˜ (·) being scaled up or down by n% as well. Surely this particular normalization is
arbitrary and it will condition the size of the lifetime public premia found under either specification.
The reason we adopted it was to ensure scale consistency between lifetime values and permanent
incomes.
39The implicit assumption of an infinite life expectancy after retirement overestimates the value of retirement by
about 10%.
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6.2 The role of income mobility
The aggregate picture. We begin the analysis by running a series of counterfactual simula-
tions in which we rule out any mobility between labor market states. Indulging in a slight misuse
of language, we shall refer to these simulations as the “job for life” case. Individual trajectories
are simulated under the assumption that the probabilities of moving between sectors or into un-
employment are zero. The only sources of differences in lifetime values are hence cross-sectional
income differences and differences in income mobility across sectors. Ruling out inter-sector mo-
bility (whose role we shall explore in the next subsection) allows us to obtain a neat picture of the
impact of income mobility on the public lifetime premium.
Figure 5 displays the public premium in terms of income and lifetime values with either a
logarithmic or a CRRA utility by percentiles in their respective distributions, under the “job for
life” assumption. The “whole sample, with selection” graph relates to predicted “raw” differences,
i.e. it plots the difference between quantiles of income flows and lifetime values among individuals
effectively observed to hold public jobs in the initial period, and corresponding quantiles of income
flows and lifetime values among workers observed to hold private jobs in the initial period. The
“whole sample” graph relates to predicted differences in incomes and in lifetime values across sectors
for all individuals in the sample, i.e. it compares income and lifetime values that each individual
could potentially earn in either sector.
< Figure 5 about here. >
First looking at the “whole sample” graph, we see that the public premium in predicted income
decreases as ones goes up the income distribution, from a positive premium of about 20 log points
in the first two deciles to a negative premium of 2 to 9 log points in the top two deciles. This is a
reflection of the well-documented phenomenon of relative income compression in the public sector.
The picture is quite different in terms of lifetime values. Under the logarithmic utility specifica-
tion, the lifetime public premium is smaller than the income public premium in the first two deciles
of the distribution (10 to 15 log points) and larger in the upper part (5 to 6 log points in the top
two deciles). Moreover, the lifetime public gap remains positive throughout lifetime value quantiles,
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whereas the income gap becomes negative in the top quartile of income. The CRRA case differs
from the logarithmic utility case in that the lifetime public premium is everywhere higher in the
CRRA case. This of course results from the fact that income risk matters to agents endowed with a
less-than-infinite elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and we saw at various points that income
risk—as measured by cross-sectional income variance or by the persistence of income ranks—was
markedly smaller in the public than in the private sector.
The striking result is thus that there is considerably less compression in the public sector
relative to the private sector in terms of lifetime values than in terms of income flows. We interpret
this phenomenon as the result of income mobility offsetting differences in cross-sectional incomes:
intuitively, thinking of log incomes as the sum of a permanent random individual effect and a
transitory random shock (both sector-specific), our results suggest that most of the observed relative
income compression in the public sector is due to a lower variance of the transitory component of
income, which is averaged out when taking lifetime values. To further investigate this intuitive
statement, let us consider some generic variable Xi representing either incomes or lifetime values
in the initial 1996 cross-section of our sample. Given permanent employment in either the public
or private sector (i.e. ei = 1 and pubi = 0 or 1), we can define the permanent component of Xi as
the projection of Xi on time-invariant individual attributes, i.e. E
(
Xi | ei,pubi, z
f
i , k
m
i , k
y
i
)
and
consider the following variance decomposition for Xi:
Var (Xi | ei,pubi) = Var
[
E
(
Xi | ei,pubi, z
f
i , k
m
i , k
y
i
)]
+ E
[
Var
(
Xi | ei,pubi, z
f
i , k
m
i , k
y
i
)]
. (16)
The first term in the r.h.s. of (16) reflects the contribution of the permanent component of Xi to
Var (Xi | ei,pubi), while the second term relates to the transitory component of Xi.
< Table 9 about here. >
Table 9 reports the variance decomposition in (16) for income and lifetime values (still under
the “job for life” assumption) in the public and private sectors.40 The first row relates to income
and confirms the well-documented public sector income compression: cross-sectional log income
40All reported numbers relate to the whole sample and thus do not reflect endogenous selection of individuals into
sectors. Moreover we focus on the logarithmic specification of utility functions, as log-income flows are more directly
comparable with present discounted values of log income flows. Results for the CRRA specification, which brings in
an additional nonlinear transformation of log income, are available upon request.
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variance is 50 percent larger in the private sector. The decomposition further indicates that this
differential is mainly driven by a greater variance of the transitory component of income in the
private sector (both in absolute terms and as a fraction of the total variance). Next turning to
lifetime values (second row), we no longer see much compression in the public sector, as total cross-
sectional variance of lifetime values is only 10 percent smaller in the public than in the private
sector. Moreover, the variance of the transitory component of lifetime values is the same in both
sectors and now explains a larger share of total variance of lifetime values in the public than in the
private sector. Comparison of the two rows consistently reveals that going from income to lifetime
values substantially reduces the relative importance of the transitory component in total variance
in the private sector, while it leaves the variance decomposition essentially unaffected in the public
sector.
To understand those decompositions more clearly, let us recall that log income flows yit are
modeled as the sum of a predictable mean µit and a (normal) persistent disturbance σit · y˜it that
follows an AR(2) process—see equations (7) and (11). This latter is transitory by its nature, and
surely constitutes the main part of the transitory component in equation (16) and Table 9.41 We
found evidence above (see Figures 2 and 3) that these income disturbances exhibit greater variance
but less persistence in the private than in the public sector. This is consistent with the observation
from Table 9 that the variance of the transitory component is reduced when taking lifetime values
to a much greater extent in the private than in the public sector.
The overall conclusion that we can draw from these results is twofold. First, income inequality
is greater yet less persistent in the private sector than in the public sector. Second, we find that
there is no sizeable cross-sector difference in “long-term” inequality as measured by the variance of
present discounted sum of log incomes.
41Even though the two concepts are not fully confounded. Given our maintained assumption of permanent employ-
ment in either the public or private sector (i.e. eit ≡ 1 and pubit ≡ 0 or 1 for all t), the deterministic component of
income µit still varies over time because of the returns to experience. Yet these returns differ little between the two
sectors. And of course part of the transitory component in Table 9 may also reflect measurement error, the extent of
which may potentially differ between sectors. Our results are subject to this latter qualification.
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Selection into sectors. Looking at the “whole sample, with selection” graph, we observe similar
patterns of lifetime public premium as above. Both premia are larger here, averaging about 17 log
points for the logarithmic utility and 21 for the CRRA utility. Comparing this with the “whole
sample” graph suggests that about half of the public-private gaps in lifetime values observed here
are a product of selection effects, whereby individuals with higher potential incomes or higher
employability are selected into the public sector. This echoes the composition of sectors in terms of
education levels: we saw in Section 3 that employees of the public sector have substantially higher
academic qualifications than average. Selection on unobservables, on the other hand, follows a
more complex pattern involving unobserved determinants of income (ky) as well as mobility (km).
Conditional on being employed, both income classes are split between the public and private sector
in roughly similar proportions (17% public for income class 1, 18% for income class 2). Yet, as one
sees on Figure 2, members of income class ky = 2—which we labeled the “high public premium”
workers—enjoy a much higher income premium in the public sector than members of income class
ky = 1. One would thus expect to see members of income class 2 go to the public sector in far larger
proportions. However, as we pointed out in Section 5 (Table 5), being a “high public premium”
worker is often associated with being a member of mobility class km = 2—the “low-employability”
class—and thus having high job loss rates and low job access rates altogether. This seems to point
to a phenomenon of job queuing in the public sector, something we shall see again below.
Conditioning on individual heterogeneity. Figure 6 displays means of lifetime public sector
premia by groups of a given education level, experience range and unobserved heterogeneity class,
together with the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The top row shows a breakdown of the
sample by mobility classes while the bottom row shows a breakdown by income classes. Lifetime
values are computed under the logarithmic specification.42
< Figure 6 about here. >
Looking at all 9 panels, one first sees that lifetime public premia vary widely across groups, from
42Graphs for the CRRA specification are available on request. Also note that, to save on space, we do not report
lifetime premia conditional on interactions of both dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity, km ans ky.
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a low of a negative few log points for members of income class 1 at early stages of their working
lives to a high of 15 to 20 log points for low-educated, senior members of the “low employability”
mobility class (km = 2) or the “high public premium” income class (ky = 2). Also it appears that
those conditional lifetime public premia tend to decrease somewhat with education and increase
with experience, with the exception of the low-educated subgroup of the “public” mobility class
(km = 1), for which lifetime public premia are highest at the beginning of the working life (i.e.
under 4 years of experience).
The top row further shows that members of the “low employability” mobility class (km = 2)
generally benefit from larger lifetime public premia than other mobility classes by around 5 log
points. This combined with the fact that the unemployment rate of this mobility class is highest
(at 39%) is again suggestive of job queuing for public sector jobs, whereby individuals from this
class find it difficult to find and retain public sector employment. Members of the “public” mobility
class (km = 1) who are found to work predominantly in the public sector enjoy lifetime value premia
in that sector that are equal or greater than those enjoyed by members of the “private” mobility
class (km = 3). These differences are significant for low-educated groups at all levels of experience
and for the highly educated in the experience range of 5 to 14 years. While these differences in
lifetime public premia between the “private” and “public” mobility classes are admittedly tenuous,
they still suggest that expected lifetime premia are related to the selection pattern of individuals
into job sectors.43
Finally turning to the bottom panel of Figure 6, we see that lifetime public premia are con-
sistently and significantly higher for groups of individuals in the “high public premium” income
class (ky = 2) than for groups of individuals in the other income class, as the name suggests. This
difference in premia is around 10 log points at all levels of education and experience.
43An additional qualification that applies to this argument is that lifetime public premia are significantly positive
even for groups of individuals in the “private” class (km = 3).
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6.3 The role of job mobility
We now restore the possibility of job mobility by adopting an alternative definition of sector-
specific lifetime values: we simulate income trajectories imposing that the individual be employed
in a given sector in the first period, but allowing him to move between sectors or into unemployment
thereafter according to his predicted transition probabilities. Public premia based on this definition
are depicted on Figure 7 for the whole sample.44
< Figure 7 about here. >
The striking point about Figure 7 is that in all panels, most public-private differences in lifetime
values disappear when we allow workers to switch between sectors, regardless of the particular
specialization retained for the instantaneous utility function. The public premium is less than 2
log points in absolute value at all quantiles in the “whole sample” graph (with a small positive
premium of 3 to 5 log points remaining in the bottom few percentiles). Comparing this with
the “whole sample, with selection” graph where the public premium in lifetime values is positive
everywhere again points to the importance of selection effects.
It thus seems that job mobility has a strong “equalizing effect” on lifetime values. An obvious
driving force behind this effect is that workers may not stay long in the initial sector that we
impose on them. Individuals who are observed to work, say in the private sector, are predominantly
members of mobility class km = 3 (see Table 3), who have a strong propensity not only to stay in,
but also to move into the private sector (see the transition matrices in Table 4). Hence, when we
counter-factually place these individuals in the public sector in the initial period, it does not take
them long to go back into the private sector. And of course, the fewer periods they initially spend
in the public sector, the less this initial spell weighs in their lifetime value.
Workers indeed move back very quickly to their “natural” sector: among individuals of the
“private” class (km = 3) whom we simulate to start out as public sector employees, about 88%
have left the public sector within one year and another 10% do so within 2 years. Almost all of these
leavers (99%) go to private sector employment “directly”, while the remaining 1% are observed at
44To save on space, we do not display the corresponding analysis by groups of individual heterogeneity.
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least once in unemployment. Individuals of the “public” class (km = 1) whom we simulate to start
out in the private sector remain there for longer: “only” 45% leave within one year and another
24% within 2 years, again almost exclusively (99%) toward a public sector job. Individuals of the
“low-employability” class (km = 2) have a less clear-cut pattern of selection into sectors, as Table 4
above showed: if we place them in the public sector in the initial period, 28% of them leave within
one year and another 21% within 2 years, 80% of these because they have found employment in the
private sector. However, if they start off in the private sector, only about 6% leave every year over
the first few years, and fewer thereafter, 54% of these to take up employment in the public sector
while the other 46% become unemployed.
So even though it seems somewhat more difficult to move from the private to the public
sector than in the opposite direction, spell durations in “counterfactual” job sectors are short
enough to contend that there is sufficient mobility in the UK labor market to allow at least “high-
employability” workers to select themselves effectively into their “natural” sector.
6.4 (A glimpse of) sensitivity analysis
The above developments involve calibrated values for the annual discount rate β and the income
replacement ratio at the point of retirement, RR. The particular values of β = 0.9 and RR = 0.4
that were adopted obviously condition the results described in this Section.
The impact of a change in the rate of time discounting is obvious enough, as a smaller value
of β clearly makes lifetime values stick more closely to current income flows. Hence for brevity we
choose not to report any quantitative sensitivity analysis on β.45
As for the sensitivity of our results to the replacement ratio, the following can be said. First,
due to time discounting, increasing the replacement ratio only has a sizeable (positive) impact
on lifetime values of individuals who are close to retirement age. Second, a uniform increase in
the value of the replacement ratio has little discernible impact on the public premium in lifetime
values. (It only magnifies the impact of the income gap at the time of retirement.) Yet, there are
institutional differences in pension schemes between the public and the private sector, which might
45Such quantitative analysis is available on request.
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potentially translate into differences in replacement ratios across sectors. While such differences do
not appear in our data, recent policy changes regarding pension schemes in the private sector are
likely to impact on these differences.
7 Conclusion
The current debate on the existence and size of differences between public and private sector pay
usually focuses on cross-section differences in earnings. In a dynamic environment, individuals
will however anticipate changes in their employment status, sector of employment and income
level within a given sector. This will matter in their assessment of the lifetime value of potential
employment in either sector. In this paper we take a view on public-private differences beyond cross-
section to account for job and income mobility. To this end, we construct a flexible model of income
dynamics and of selection of individuals into employment sectors, where individual income and
employment processes are conditioned by observed as well as unobserved individual heterogeneity.
Estimating this model over the last 7 waves of the BHPS, we are able to replicate very well
worker mobility across labor market states and income trajectories, both in and out of sample. We
use our estimated model to simulate individual working lives for all workers in our sample and are
able to compute lifetime values of their income streams and compare these across sectors.
Our main results are the following. The average public premium in terms of present discounted
sum of future log-incomes would be positive, were individuals planning to remain employed all
their working life in either sector. If, however, job mobility is taken into account in that individuals
are allowed to switch employment sector in the simulations, the public premium in lifetime values
becomes essentially zero for “highly employable” individuals. This suggests that the UK labor
market is sufficiently mobile to ensure a rapid allocation of these workers into their “natural”
sector. Finally, although we document the well-known income compression in the public sector, we
find that this compression phenomenon mostly disappears when considering lifetime values. We
thus argue that the greater variance of private sector incomes relates to the transitory component
of income.
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As to general leads for future research, our model of employment and income dynamics is flexible
enough and can be fairly easily estimated and used to simulate individual income and employment
trajectories. It hence can be a useful tool for a variety of applications in the study of inequality
between socio-economic groups or over time in the labor market.
Pointing back to the public gap, for the sake of brevity, we have restricted the analysis in the
present paper to male individuals. Looking at the female dataset has been left for future research
and raises additional issues. First, average hours worked and the extent of part-time work vary
substantially across sectors, and would require a finer description of the labor supply behavior.
Second, non-wage job characteristics, such as different provision of maternity benefits and flexible
hours of work are likely to influence the selection of women across sectors.
Another interesting extension of this paper would be to carry out this analysis with data for other
countries. Studies on pay differences between public and private sectors document the phenomenon
of income compression for numerous countries. Our model provides a way of assessing whether this
pertains mainly to the transitory component of income, as we find for the UK, or whether it reflects
some more permanent inequality between sector-specific income distributions.46 Estimation of our
model, however, would require panel datasets with similar characteristics to the BHPS (long enough
longitudinal dimension and still a reasonable cross-sectional width).
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APPENDIX
A Model specification
In this Appendix we describe our functional form assumptions in full detail. For clarity, we first recall
some notation and the basic structure of our statistical model. The sample is a set of N workers indexed
i = 1, . . . N , each of whom we follow over Ti consecutive years. A typical individual observation i is a vector
xi =
(
yi, ei,pubi, z
v
i , z
f
i
)
, to which we append a pair ki = (k
m
i , k
y
i ) of unobserved class indexes.
As explained in Section 4 of the main text, individual i’s contribution to the complete likelihood has
three components (see equation (1)), pertaining respectively to unobserved heterogeneity, labor market status
history and income history. We now give the full specification of each of these components separately. In all
instances, our specific choice of covariates was guided by the descriptive analysis of Section 3 as well as by
a concern for parsimony and numerical tractability.
Unobserved heterogeneity. As indicated by equation (2), attachment of individual i to a given latent
class ki = (k
m
i , k
y
i ) is modeled as the product of two terms: ℓi
(
ki | z
f
i
)
= Pr
{
kyi | k
m
i , z
f
i
}
· Pr
{
kmi | z
f
i
}
,
which we both specify as multinomial logits:
Pr
{
kmi = k
m | zfi
}
=
exp
(
zfi
′
· κmkm
)
∑Km
k=1 exp
(
zfi
′
· κmk
) and Pr{kyi | kmi , zfi } =
exp
[(
zfi
kmi
)′
· κyky
]
∑Ky
k=1 exp
[(
zfi
kmi
)′
· κyk
] , (A1)
where κm1 and κ
y
1 are both normalized at zero.
Labor market states. From equations (3), (4) and (5), we know that individual labor market histories
contribute to the complete likelihood as:
ℓi
(
ei,pubi | z
v
i , z
f
i , k
m
i
)
= Pr
{
ei1 | z
f
i , k
m
i
}
×
[
Pr
{
pubi1 | z
f
i , k
m
i
}]ei1
×
Ti∏
t=2
(
Pr
{
eit | ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
i,t−1, z
f
i , k
m
i
}
·
[
Pr
{
pubit | ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
i,t−1, z
f
i , k
m
i
}]eit)
. (A2)
All components are specified as logits:
Pr
{
eit | ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
i,t−1, z
f
i , k
m
i
}
= Λ
([
ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
i,t−1
′, zfi
′
, kmi
′
]
· ψ
)
,
Pr
{
pubit | ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
i,t−1, z
f
i , k
m
i
}
= Λ
([
ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
i,t−1
′, zfi
′
, kmi
′
]
· χ
)
, (A3)
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where Λ (x) = (1 + e−x)
−1
designates the logistic cdf.47 We finally use mutatis mutandis similar specifica-
tions for the initial job state probabilities:
Pr
{
ei1 | z
f
i , k
m
i
}
= Λ
([
zfi
′
, kmi
′
]
· ψ0
)
and Pr
{
pubi1 | z
f
i , k
m
i
}
== Λ
([
zfi
′
, kmi
′
]
· χ0
)
. (A4)
Income. Given what is explained about our modeling of individual income paths in the main text, all we
need to spell out in this Appendix is the set of functions {µ (·) , σ (·) , τ1 (·) , τ2 (·)} introduced in equations
(7) and (9). We start with µ (·):
µ
(
eit,pubit, z
v
it, z
f
i , k
y
i
)
= zfi
′
· µ0 +
[(
eit
pubit
)
∗ kyi ∗ z
v
it
]
′
· µ1, (A5)
where the notation x ∗ y stands for all main effects and interactions of variables x and y. As one sees from
this latter equation, we allow the returns on experience to differ across job sectors and income classes.
As for log income variance, we posit:
σ (eit,pubit, z
v
it, k
y
i ) =
√√√√exp([( eit
pubit
)
∗ kyi
]
′
· σ0 + zvit
′ · σ1
)
. (A6)
Here we force the variance of log income to be positive by specifying it as an exponential. Also, the functional
form used for σ (·) is somewhat more constrained than the one we use for income means. In particular, time-
invariant observed individual characteristics, zfi , are not retained among the arguments of σ (·)—that is, we
assume that zfi only impacts income variance through its link to unobserved income classes, k
y
i . We also
omit interactions of employment state or income class and experience.
We finally turn to the dynamics of income, which are governed by the functions τ1 (·) and τ2 (·). The
first-order autocorrelation of income, τ1 (·), is specified as:
τ1
(
eit,pubit, ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
it, k
y
i
)
= −1 + 2 · Λ
(
[zvit ∗ k
y
i ]
′
· ζ0 +
[(
eit
pubit
)
∗ kyi
]
′
· ζ1 +
[(
ei,t−1
pubi,t−1
)
∗ kyi
]
′
· ζ2
)
. (A7)
This specification calls for some comments. First, the transformation −1+2 ·Λ (·) which we apply to a linear
index in the explanatory variables is there to constrain τ1 (·), a correlation coefficient, to lie within [−1,+1].
Second, we again subsume the impact of zfi into that of k
y
i , which in turn conditions all coefficients in the
latter equation. Third, we do not allow for all possible interaction between current and past labor market
states, (eit,pubit) and
(
eit−1,pubit−1
)
.48
47Note that unobserved mobility heterogeneity kmi only affects the constant term in this specification. The number
of observed sector transitions in our data set does not seem to be sufficient for a precise estimation of less restrictive
specifications. For instance we tried allowing the effect of experience on sector mobility to differ between mobility
classes by considering interaction terms of kmi and z
v
i,t−1. The corresponding parameters turned out to be very poorly
estimated.
48The type of constraint that we impose is that the marginal effect on τ1 (·) of being observed, say, in the public
sector at date t− 1 is independent of the particular sector in which one is observed at date t. Here again, we chose
to impose this restriction after a large number of trials with more elaborate specifications, the impact of which was
essentially to increase computation time for very little gain in terms of fit.
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The correlation between normalized income and normalized income lagged twice, τ2 (·), is slightly more
involved. Let us first recall the notation shortcuts designating the date-t, one- and two-lag autocorrelations
of normalized income used in the main text (equation (9)):
τi,t,t−1 = τ1
(
eit,pubit, ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
it, k
y
i
)
and τi,t,t−2 = τ2
(
eit,pubit, ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, ei,t−2,pubi,t−2, z
v
it, k
y
i
)
.
Then we write:
τ2
(
eit,pubit, ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, ei,t−2,pubi,t−2, z
v
it, k
y
i
)
= τi,t,t−1 · τi,t−1,t−2
+
(√(
1− τ2i,t,t−1
)
·
(
1− τ2i,t−1,t−2
))
· τ˜2 (k
y
i ) , (A8)
with τ˜2 (k
y
i ) = −1 + 2 · Λ
(
kyi
′
· ξ
)
simply specified as an income class-specific constant within [−1,+1].
This last pair of equations requires some clarification. We have to constrain τ2 (·) in such a way that,
given τi,t,t−1 and τi,t−1,t−2, the matrix:
τ
(3)
it =
 1 τi,t,t−1 τi,t,t−2τi,t,t−1 1 τi,t−1,t−2
τi,t,t−2 τi,t−1,t−2 1

is a consistent covariance matrix. This is the case provided that its determinant ∆it is positive (and that the
various τ ’s lie in [−1,+1]). ∆it is defined by ∆it = 1− τ2i,t,t−1− τ
2
i,t−1,t−2− τ
2
i,t,t−2+2τi,t,t−1τi,t−1,t−2τi,t,t−2.
Solving for τi,t,t−2, we get:
τi,t,t−2 = τi,t,t−1 · τi,t−1,t−2 ±
√(
1− τ2i,t,t−1
)
·
(
1− τ2i,t−1,t−2
)
−∆it. (A9)
Because ∆it is positive, τi,t,t−2 has to stay within the interval[
τi,t,t−1 · τi,t−1,t−2 −
√(
1− τ2i,t,t−1
)
·
(
1− τ2i,t−1,t−2
)
, τ1it · τ
1
i,t−1 +
√(
1− τ2i,t,t−1
)
·
(
1− τ2i,t−1,t−2
)]
.
This is achieved by the parameterization in equation (A8) given the constraint τ˜2 (·) ∈ [−1,+1].
B Estimation details
In this Appendix we fully describe the procedure that we use for the maximization of the sample log-likelihood
(14). As briefly explained in the main text (sub-section 4.5, footnote 25), this procedure consists of a first
“calibration” stage, from which we get parameter estimates to use as initial values in a second “likelihood
maximization” stage.
B.1 Stage 1: Model calibration using a sequential EM algorithm
B.1.1 General description
From Appendix A and Section 4 in the main text, the list of parameters to be estimated can be di-
vided into 2 subsets, Θm =
{
(κmk )
Km
k=1 , ψ0, χ0;ψ;χ
}
and Θy =
{
(κyk)
Ky
k=1
, µ (·) , σ (·) , τ1 (·) , τ˜2 (·)
}
, where
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by {µ (·) , σ (·) , τ1 (·) , τ˜2 (·)} we summarize all parameters of the corresponding functions—see equations
(A5), (A6), (A7) and (A8). The first subset, Θm, gathers all parameters from the job mobility process—i.e.
involved in equations (A1), (A3) and (A4). The subset Θy contains all remaining parameters, which all
pertain to the income process—see equations (A5) through (A8).
The structure of (1) implies that individual contributions to the complete likelihood can be decomposed
as Li (xi, ki; Θ
m,Θy) = Lmi (xi, k
m
i ; Θ
m) · Lyi (xi, k
m
i , k
y
i ; Θ
y), where:
Lmi (xi, k
m
i ; Θ
m) = ℓi
(
ei,pubi | z
v
i , z
f
i , k
m
i ; Θ
m
)
· Pr
{
kmi | z
f
i ; Θ
m
}
(B1)
(note that we now make the dependence on the various parameters explicit). This particular structure
makes it very easy to integrate income sequences (yi) and income classes (k
y
i ) out of Li (xi, ki; Θ
m,Θy).
We can thus recover the parameters pertaining to the job mobility process and job mobility classes by
separately considering the likelihood of observed job sector mobility,
∑N
i=1 log
(∑Km
km
i
=1 L
m
i (xi, k
m
i ; Θ
m)
)
.
Given the simple structure of our job mobility model, this maximization can be achieved by a straightforward
application of the EM algorithm for finite mixtures, which we describe below in paragraph B.1.2.
Once this first sub-stage has delivered estimates of the “job mobility” parameters, we fix those at their
estimated values Θ̂m and turn back to the maximization of the sample likelihood, Li
(
xi, ki; Θ̂
m,Θy
)
, now
concentrating on the “income process” part of this likelihood, Lyi (xi, k
m
i , k
y
i ; Θ
y), and the related parameters
Θy. We give the technical details of this second sub-stage below in paragraph B.1.3.
B.1.2 Stage 1.1: Calibration of the job mobility parameters Θm
The standard EM-algorithm consists of iterating the following two steps:
E-step. For an initial value Θmn of Θ
m, for each mobility class index km = 1, . . . ,Km, and for each
individual i in the sample, compute the posterior probability that i belongs to mobility class km given xi
and Θmn :
Pr {kmi = k
m | xi; Θ
m
n } =
Lmi (xi, k
m; Θmn )∑Km
k=1 L
m
i (xi, k; Θ
m
n )
. (B2)
M-step. Update Θmn into Θ
m
n+1 by maximizing the following augmented sample log-likelihood, weighted
by (B2):
Θmn+1 = argmax
Θm
N∑
i=1
Km∑
k=1
Pr {kmi = k | xi; Θ
m
n } · log [L
m
i (xi, k; Θ
m)] . (B3)
This latter maximization is easily carried out running separate weighted logit regressions for ψ and χ (see
equations (A3) and (A4), and a weighted multinomial logit for the class weight parameters κmk , using (B2)
as weights in each case.
This algorithm converges to the MLE of Θm (Dempster et al., 1977). In practice we stop iterating when
the maximum relative change between Θmn and Θ
m
n+1 falls below 10
−3, and thus obtain our estimate Θ̂m.
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B.1.3 Stage 1.2: Calibration of the income parameters Θy
We then want to calibrate the subset of “income” parameters, Θy. The natural “limited information”
approach would be to maximize the sample likelihood, Li
(
xi, ki; Θ̂
m,Θy
)
, only fixing Θm at its estimated
value Θ̂m from stage 1.1. Yet again the highly nonlinear nature of Lyi (·)—see subsection 4.4—renders
even this maximization numerically difficult. At this calibration stage we thus choose not to use direct
maximization but rather a sequential, limited information version of the EM algorithm in the spirit of
Arcidiacono and Jones (2003) or Bonhomme and Robin (2004). This algorithm goes as follows:
E-step. For an initial value Θyn of Θ
y, for each class index k = (km, ky), km = 1, . . . ,Km, ky = 1, . . . ,Ky,
and for each individual i in the sample, compute the posterior probability that i belongs to mobility class
km and income class ky given xi, Θ
y
n and Θ̂
m:
Pr
{
kmi = k
m, kyi = k
y | xi; Θ̂
m,Θyn
}
=
Li
(
xi, k
m, ky; Θ̂m,Θyn
)
∑Km
ℓm=1
∑Ky
ℓy=1 Li
(
xi, ℓm, ℓy; Θ̂m,Θ
y
n
) . (B4)
M-step. This is where our algorithm differs a bit from the standard EM. Specifically, we proceed as
follows:
1. Update income mean parameters µ (·) using weighted OLS regressions of yit on
(
eit,pubit, z
v
it, z
f
i , k
y
i
)
,
using (B4) as weights. Denote the updated function µ (·) as µ̂n+1 (·).
2. Take the (log) squared residuals from the latter regression and regress those on
(
eit,pubit, z
v
it, z
f
i , k
y
i
)
,
again using weighted OLS, to update income variance parameters σ (·). Denote the update as σ̂n+1 (·).
3. Form log income disturbances y˜
(n+1)
it =
yit−bµn+1(eit,pubit,zvit,z
f
i
,k
y
i )
bσn+1(eit,pubit,zvit,z
f
i
,k
y
i )
. Update τ1 (·) as:
τ̂1,n+1
(
eit,pubit, ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
it, k
y
i
)
= cov
(
y˜
(n+1)
it , y˜
(n+1)
i,t−1
)
, (B5)
given that
(
y˜
(n+1)
it , y˜
(n+1)
i,t−1
)
is distributed bivariate normal with unit variances. We do this by weighted
maximum likelihood, using (B4) as weights. Then similarly update τ˜2 (·) knowing that τ2 (·) =
cov
(
y˜
(n+1)
it , y˜
(n+1)
i,t−2
)
is given by formula (A8), and that
(
y˜
(n+1)
it , y˜
(n+1)
i,t−2
)
is again distributed bivariate
normal with unit variances. Note that τ1 (·) is involved in (A8), and that we replace it by τ̂1,n+1 (·)
for the update of τ˜2 (·).
4. Finally update the set of income class assignment parameters, (κyk)
Ky
k=1
by running a weighted multino-
mial logit regression of class indexes on
(
zfi , k
m
i
)
, again using (B4) as weights.
We iterate the E- and M-steps above until the maximum relative change between two consecutive updates
of Θy becomes less than 10−3.
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B.2 Stage 2: likelihood maximization
The big advantage of the sequential algorithm used in stage 1 is that it is computationally more stable
(given arbitrary starting values) and more tractable than direct, “full information” maximization of the
total sample likelihood (14). Moreover, it can be shown (under the combined assumption of identification
of the model parameters and numerical convergence of the algorithm) to converge to a consistent estimator
of the parameters (see Arcidiacono and Jones, 2003, or Bonhomme and Robin ,2004, Appendix C).49 Its
drawback, however, is that it converges to an estimator which differs from the ML estimator and which is
not efficient.50
In spite of this inefficiency, the estimates of Θm and Θy obtained from stage 1 turn out to be close
enough to full-information ML estimates to at least constitute very good initial values to feed into a standard
optimization routine applied to the total sample likelihood (14). Pursuing this idea, stage 2 simply consists
of maximizing (14) starting from the values of Θm and Θy obtained from stage 1.
49Another advantage of multi-step methods is that they leave no ambiguity as to what part of the data serves for
the estimation of a given set of parameters. In our case, for instance, parameters of the job mobility process are
estimated for labor market state records alone, while parameters of the income process are estimated to fit income
histories
50It is inefficient for two reasons. First, it is two-step. Second, the “income” step 1.2 itself is sequential, i.e. in
that step we update the parameters sequentially (as opposed to simultaneously) within each iteration. By using
such a sequential approach, we throw away some information (in effect, we are only matching a number of selected
means and covariances, e.g. we only use income cross-sections—and not income dynamics—to update the mean and
variance parameters) and thus lose some efficiency.
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C Parameter estimates
Initial unemployment probability: Pr
{
ei1 = 0 | z
f
i , k
m
i
}
Experience (years/10) 0.030
(0.348)
Experience2 (years2/100) 0.100
(0.083)
High education −0.995
(0.343)
Medium education −0.192
(0.385)
km = 2 6.026
(1.247)
km = 3 1.530
(1.280)
Constant −6.566
(1.325)
Subsequent unemployment probability: Pr
{
eit = 0 | ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
i,t−1, z
f
i , k
m
i
}
, t ≥ 2
Experience (years/10) −0.670
(0.263)
Experience2 (years2/100) 0.180
(0.056)
High education −1.058
(0.234)
Medium education −0.136
(0.219)
Public last period: pubi,t−1 = 1 −0.209
(0.448)
Unemployed last period: ei,t−1 = 0 2.561
(0.179)
km = 2 3.827
(0.960)
km = 3 0.739
(0.971)
Constant −5.284
(1.025)
Initial probability of public sector: Pr
{
pubi1 = 0 | z
f
i , k
m
i
}
Experience (years/10) 0.402
(0.409)
Experience2 (years2/100) −0.087
(0.096)
High education 1.442
(0.307)
Medium education 0.412
(0.335)
km = 2 −3.608
(0.524)
km = 3 −6.386
(0.344)
Constant 1.153
(0.502)
Subsequent prob. of public sector: Pr
{
pubit = 0 | ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
i,t−1, z
f
i , k
m
i
}
, t ≥ 2
Experience (years/10) −0.221
(0.326)
Experience2 (years2/100) 0.016
(0.066)
High education 0.863
(0.233)
Medium education 0.249
(0.274)
Public last period: pubi,t−1 = 1 3.610
(0.178)
Unemployed last period: ei,t−1 = 0 0.784
(0.368)
km = 2 −2.710
(0.296)
km = 3 −5.382
(0.354)
Constant −0.174
(0.461)
Table C1: Parameters of job sector mobility (logit models)
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Income means: µ
(
eit,pubit, z
v
it, z
f
i , k
y
i
)
High education 0.440
(0.015)
Medium education 0.134
(0.015)
Experience (years/10) 0.529
(0.023)
Experience2 (years2/100) −0.084
(0.005)
Public: pubit = 1 −0.012
(0.034)
Experience×Public −0.007
(0.031)
Experience2×Public 0.005
(0.006)
Unemployed: eit = 0 −1.513
(0.095)
Experience×Unemployed −0.340
(0.082)
Experience2×Unemployed 0.084
(0.015)
ky = 2 0.066
(0.058)
(ky = 2)×Experience −0.182
(0.053)
(ky = 2)×Experience2 0.019
(0.011)
(ky = 2)×Public 0.207
(0.089)
(ky = 2)×Public×Experience −0.063
(0.080)
(ky = 2)×Public×Experience2 0.013
(0.015)
(ky = 2)×Unemployed −0.069
(0.191)
(ky = 2)×Unemployed×Experience 0.721
(0.184)
(ky = 2)×Unemployed×Experience2 −0.167
(0.038)
Constant 6.568
(0.028)
Income standard deviations: σ (eit,pubit, z
v
it, k
y
i )
Experience (years/10) 0.082
(0.016)
Public: pubit = 1 −0.055
(0.048)
Unemployed: eit = 0 −0.577
(0.115)
ky = 2 0.753
(0.044)
(ky = 2)×Public −0.868
(0.099)
(ky = 2)×Unemployed 0.984
(0.137)
Constant −2.055
(0.046)
Table C2: Parameters of cross-sectional income means and standard deviations
First-order income autocorrelation: τ1
(
eit,pubit, ei,t−1,pubi,t−1, z
v
it, k
y
i
)
(ky = 1)×Experience 0.170
(0.021)
(ky = 1)×Public 1.106
(0.119)
(ky = 1)×Unemployed −0.245
(0.220)
(ky = 1)×(Public last period) −0.149
(0.116)
(ky = 1)×(Unemployed last period) −2.450
(0.197)
ky = 1 2.817
(0.061)
(ky = 2)×Experience 0.083
(0.024)
(ky = 2)×Public 0.418
(0.104)
(ky = 2)×Unemployed −0.362
(0.106)
(ky = 2)×(Public last period) 0.403
(0.093)
(ky = 2)×(Unemployed last period) −0.462
(0.111)
ky = 2 0.900
(0.066)
Second-order income autocorrelation: τ˜2 (k
y
i )
ky = 1 0.517
(0.029)
ky = 2 0.404
(0.031)
Table C3: Parameters of income mobility
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Mobility heterogeneity: Pr
{
kmi = 2 | z
f
i
}
Experience (years/10) −0.072
(0.011)
High Education −1.023
(0.286)
Medium education −1.127
(0.321)
Constant 1.774
(0.291)
Mobility heterogeneity: Pr
{
kmi = 3 | z
f
i
}
Experience (years/10) −0.020
(0.006)
High Education −0.914
(0.140)
Medium education −0.472
(0.143)
Constant 2.302
(0.181)
Income heterogeneity: Pr
{
kyi = 2 | k
m
i , z
f
i
}
Experience (years/10) 0.012
(0.004)
High Education −0.624
(0.127)
Medium education −0.225
(0.118)
km = 2 1.371
(0.297)
km = 3 −0.292
(0.151)
Constant −0.382
(0.188)
Table C4: Parameters of unobserved heterogeneity (multinomial logit models)
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Dependent variable: log monthly income
Specification number...
1 2 3 4 5
Constant 7.277
(.004)
7.122
(.015)
7.141
(.017)
6.311
(.037)
6.297
(.038)
Public 0.138
(.010)
0.049
(.010)
−0.005
(.042)
0.083
(.018)
0.212
(.059)
Unemployment −1.583
(.023)
−1.495
(.020)
−1.918
(.096)
−1.239
(.022)
−1.302
(.084)
Medium ed. — −0.314
(.010)
−0.329
(.023)
— —
Low ed. — −0.442
(.009)
−0.471
(.010)
— —
Experience (years/10) — 0.423
(.015)
0.430
(.017)
0.688
(.030)
0.702
(.031)
Experience2 (years2/100) — −0.076
(.003)
−0.076
(.003)
−0.091
(.006)
−0.094
(.006)
Public×Medium ed. — — 0.048
(.026)
— —
Public×Low ed. — — 0.119
(.023)
— —
Unempl.×Medium ed. — — 0.236
(.080)
— —
Unempl.×Low ed. — — 0.378
(.067)
— —
Public×Experience — — −0.009
(.038)
— −0.130
(.056)
Public×Experience2 — — 0.002
(.008)
— 0.026
(.012)
Unempl.×Experience — — 0.101
(.079)
— 0.067
(0.086)
Unempl.×Experience2 — — −0.016
(.016)
— −0.013
(.019)
Fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Notes: All years pooled.
Specifications 1, 2, and 3: OLS. Specifications 4 and 5: within estimator.
Reference categories are “Private sector job” and “High education”.
Standard Errors in parentheses.
Table 1: Public-private differences: mean income
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Private sector Public sector
income quintile at t income quintile at t
income
quintile
at t− 1

65.8 20.5 7.6 3.7 2.4
19.9 50.6 19.4 7.2 2.9
6.4 21.0 47.9 20.7 4.1
4.1 5.9 21.1 53.1 15.8
3.0 2.5 3.8 15.5 75.3


74.9 20.1 2.9 1.3 0.8
14.5 55.5 23.0 5.4 1.8
3.0 19.7 52.1 20.9 4.3
1.5 3.9 19.7 57.8 17.2
0.3 1.1 2.7 16.5 79.4

income
quintile
at t− 6

48.7 26.7 13.4 6.4 4.8
22.9 32.7 22.9 13.1 8.4
13.2 26.0 32.6 19.0 9.3
7.3 11.1 23.5 39.3 18.8
7.4 6.2 8.6 21.0 56.8


69.2 20.5 2.6 5.1 2.6
16.1 45.2 29.0 6.5 3.2
4.9 19.5 46.3 24.4 4.9
0.0 7.5 17.5 45.0 30.0
0.0 0.0 9.1 24.2 66.7

Note: Sector-specific income quintiles.
Table 2: Public-private differences: mobility of income ranks
Sectoral composition of classes
% of sample % private % public % unempl.
km = 1 15.45 12.17 87.58 0.25
km = 2 14.41 49.28 11.95 38.77
km = 3 70.14 97.46 1.34 1.19
Class composition of sectors
% of sample % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
Private 77.34 2.43 9.18 88.39
Public 16.20 83.55 10.63 5.82
Unemployment 6.46 0.60 86.47 12.93
Table 3: Mobility Classes
53
km = 1 km = 2
state at t state at t+ 1 state at t+ 1
↓ private public unempl. private public unemp.
private 54.0 45.7 0.3 84.1 5.1 10.8
public 3.3 96.5 0.2 30.4 60.7 8.9
unempl. 35.2 61.5 3.3 36.2 5.5 58.3
km = 3 Whole sample
private 99.0 0.4 0.6 89.9 8.0 2.1
public 87.5 11.9 0.6 66.3 32.0 1.7
unempl. 92.0 0.7 7.3 75.2 10.8 14.0
Table 4: Labor market state transition probabilities
Mobility classes
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp. % ky = 1 % ky = 2
km = 1 35.24 23.79 40.97 21.39 59.09 40.91
km = 2 29.27 14.53 56.21 14.70 28.07 71.93
km = 3 22.48 22.20 55.32 20.21 64.28 35.72
Income classes
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp. % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
ky = 1 29.43 22.34 48.24 19.09 15.67 6.94 77.38
ky = 2 19.85 19.95 60.20 20.30 15.14 24.83 60.02
Whole sample
% high ed. % med. ed. % low ed. Mean exp.
25.43 21.34 53.23 19.60
Table 5: Composition and joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity classes
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ky = 1 ky = 2
income quintile at t+ 1 income quintile at t+ 1
income
quintile
at t

78.2 19.3 1.7 0.3 0.5
14.7 64.2 19.3 1.8 0.0
1.5 20.3 57.8 19.6 0.8
0.1 1.7 20.2 63.8 14.2
0.2 0.0 0.8 13.7 85.3


61.3 19.5 9.9 5.4 3.9
25.9 35.2 19.0 13.4 6.5
15.0 21.7 32.2 21.0 10.1
11.5 12.7 22.6 34.3 18.8
8.9 7.7 10.6 21.2 51.6

Whole sample
income quintile at t+ 1
income
quintile
at t

68.2 19.4 6.5 3.3 2.5
19.1 52.8 19.2 6.3 2.6
6.2 20.8 48.9 20.1 4.0
3.8 5.2 21.0 54.4 15.7
2.7 2.3 3.7 15.9 75.4

Note: Income quintiles from the unconditional sample distribution.
Table 6: Income mobility
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Predicted Observed
state at t− 1 state at t state at t
↓ private public unempl. private public unempl.
private 96.6 1.5 1.7 96.9 1.5 1.5
public 8.1 90.9 0.9 8.2 90.1 0.8 Euclidian dist.: 2.4
unempl. 39.5 3.8 56.6 41.0 4.1 54.9 Maximum dist.: 1.8
state at t− 2
↓
private 95.2 2.4 2.3 96.7 1.7 1.4
public 11.9 86.7 1.3 11.0 88.3 0.6 Euclidian dist.: 2.9
unempl. 54.1 5.8 39.9 53.1 5.4 40.7 Maximum dist.: 1.6
...
state at t− 6
↓
private 93.8 3.5 2.6 95.3 2.9 1.7
public 19.4 78.9 1.6 20.7 78.8 0.3 Euclidian dist.: 3.2
Unempl. 67.8 8.7 23.4 69.2 7.6 23.0 Maximum dist.: 1.5
Out of sample prediction
Predicted Observed
state at t− 10 state at t state at t
↓ private public unempl. private public unempl.
private 94.3 3.2 2.3 94.1 4.0 1.7
public 23.4 76.0 0.5 29.7 69.4 0.8 Euclidian dist.: 15.7
unempl. 68.1 11.5 20.2 75.3 14.4 10.1 Maximum dist.: 10.1
Table 7: Fit to job mobility data
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Predicted Observed
income quintile at t income quintile at t
income
quintile
at t− 1

63.4 20.7 7.8 4.9 2.9
21.4 48.8 20.6 5.8 3.2
7.9 21.0 45.5 20.7 4.6
4.8 6.0 20.8 50.3 17.8
2.6 3.3 5.0 17.9 70.9


68.2 19.4 6.5 3.3 2.5
19.1 52.8 19.2 6.3 2.6
6.2 20.8 48.9 20.1 4.0
3.8 5.2 21.0 54.4 15.7
2.7 2.3 3.7 15.9 75.4

Eucl. dist.:
10.9
Max. dist.:
4.8
income
quintile
at t− 2

57.7 22.4 9.2 6.2 4.1
23.2 43.9 21.8 7.1 3.7
9.5 22.5 40.1 22.0 5.7
6.1 7.2 22.5 44.8 19.3
3.8 4.0 6.1 19.5 66.4


63.5 20.2 8.9 4.1 3.1
21.7 47.1 20.3 8.1 2.5
8.6 23.3 42.3 20.3 5.3
4.8 7.2 22.4 48.4 17.0
3.3 2.6 5.4 16.9 71.6

Eucl. dist.:
11.3
Max. dist.:
5.8
...
income
quintile
at t− 6

44.5 24.1 13.4 9.6 8.2
24.5 33.0 23.6 12.4 6.1
13.6 23.8 29.3 23.0 10.2
10.0 12.4 23.4 32.2 21.8
7.8 6.7 10.1 22.3 52.9


52.3 22.6 13.0 6.3 5.5
28.2 34.2 19.9 9.9 7.6
11.8 27.5 30.7 20.4 9.4
7.1 12.8 25.4 37.4 17.0
6.6 5.7 7.6 22.5 57.4

Eucl. dist.:
14.7
Max. dist.:
7.9
Out of sample prediction
Predicted Observed
income quintile at t income quintile at t
income
quintile
at t− 10

39.7 25.6 14.9 11.8 7.7
22.9 31.7 29.1 9.5 6.6
16.7 23.1 23.5 23.4 13.1
12.1 13.2 18.7 31.5 24.2
8.3 6.3 13.7 23.5 47.9


38.9 27.5 16.9 11.0 5.5
28.4 31.1 21.3 11.1 8.0
14.4 26.6 31.4 18.7 8.7
5.9 11.0 20.0 39.1 23.8
7.8 5.8 9.7 21.4 55.1

Eucl. dist.:
22.0
Max. dist.:
7.9
Note: Income quintiles from the unconditional sample distribution.
Table 8: Fit to income mobility data
Private sector Public sector
permanent transitory total permanent transitory total
Income 0.07
22.8%
0.22
77.2%
0.29 0.05
27.8%
0.14
72.2%
0.19
Lifetime value (log.) 0.06
35.2%
0.11
64.9%
0.17 0.04
28.2%
0.11
71.8%
0.15
Note: All numbers relate to the whole sample.
Table 9: Variance decomposition: Incomes and lifetime values
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Figure 1: Sector shares and unemployment rate, males 20-55, 1991-2002
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Figure 2: Income-experience profiles
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Figure 3: Autocovariance of normalized income
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Figure 4: Income densities
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Figure 5: The public gap: jobs for life
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
0
5
10
15
20
0 − 4 5 − 14 15 − 25 > 25
Low education
1
2
3 1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
0
5
10
15
20
0 − 4 5 − 14 15 − 25 > 25
Medium education
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
0
5
10
15
20
0 − 4 5 − 14 15 − 25 > 25
High education
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
−
10
0
10
20
30
0 − 4 5 − 14 15 − 25 > 25
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
−
10
0
10
20
30
0 − 4 5 − 14 15 − 25 > 25
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
−
10
0
10
20
30
0 − 4 5 − 14 15 − 25 > 25
Li
fe
tim
e 
pu
bl
ic 
pr
em
ia
 (lo
g p
oin
ts)
Experience (years)
Top row: labels designate mobility classes (1=Public, 2=Low emp., 3=Private).
Bottom row: labels designate income classes (1=Low public premium, 2=High public premium).
Graphs show mean public premium by category, together with 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 6: The conditional public gap: jobs for life
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Figure 7: The public gap: income flows and lifetime values
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